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HEARTBREAK HOTEL: THE DISHARMONIOUS
CONVERGENCE OF WELFARE, HOUSING AND
HOMELESSNESS
SUSAN BENNETT*
You can check in any time you like, but you can never leave.1
To say that Americans value themselves as they value their monuments
is probably not to make too sweeping a sociological statement. We celebrate our great public edifices- the Brooklyn Bridge, Fenway Park- for their
happy joining of form and function, or their nostalgic associations. 2 Archaeologists studying the 1980's will undoubtedly analyze that era as the one
which measured itself in malls. We gasp, we thrill, we buy- we am.
We have other monuments. If our true measure lies in how we treat our
most vulnerable, then the real gauges of the 1980's are a hotel and a gymnasium floor. The hotel is the Hotel Martinique, until December, 1988, 3 one of
New York City's public shelters of last resort for homeless families. The gym* Assistant Professor, Washington College of Law of the American University;
B.A., 1973, M.A., 1975, Yale University; J.D., 1979, Columbia University. The author
wishes to thank Jace, Alphonse, Doris and Bud, LJ and Rebecca, Mary, Paul, Matt
and Mark, Marcus, Cook, Carolyn and Stan. The Washington College of Law has
provided generous research support and considerable patience. Especial gratitude is
due to the other contributors to this volume, who sweat the litigation so that others
may write about it. They, and their courageous clients, are constant sources of
inspiration.
1. Felder, Frey and Henley, Hotel California, (Asylum Records, 1976-1977).
2. The impact of each of these monuments has been both captured and enhanced by its troubadours. Hart Crane celebrated the Brooklyn Bridge in "The
Bridge." See THE COMPLETE POEMS AND SELECTED LETTERS AND PROSE OF HART
CRANE 54 (Weber ed. 1966). Roger Angell and Thomas Boswell, both long-time
baseball chroniclers, have rhapsodized over the historical cosinesses of Wrigley Field
and Fenway Park, and the purist's functionality of Memorial Stadium in Baltimore. R.
ANGELL, FIVE SEASONS A BASEBALL COMPANION 88 (1977); T. BOSWELL, How LIFE
IMITATES THE WORLD SERIES 145-146 (5th ed.1986). In a typically erudite allusion, the
late A. Bartlett Giamatti traced the etymology of "paradise" to Farsi for "an enclosed
green space," with a clear reference in mind to a ball park. Siebert, Baseball's Renaissance Man, N.Y. Times (Magazine), Sept. 4, 1988, at 36.
3. See Barbanel, As a Hotel is Emptied, the Poor Move On, N. Y. Times, Dec. 27,
1988, at 131, col. 6, for a description of the move-out of families from the Martinique.
According to the article, thirteen families remained of 462 sheltered in the hotel in
March of 1988. Officials of the city of New York had publicly committed themselves to
emptying the Martinique of its families by the end of December, 1988. Homelessness
During Winter 1988-1989: Prospects for Change: Hearing before the Ad Hoc Task
Force on the Homeless and Housing of the House Comm. on the Budget, 100th
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nasium floor is that of the Randall Junior High School, where the government
of the District of Columbia provided each of twenty-five with families a living
space consisting of an area partitioned off with temporary plywood cubicles
on a basketball court.4 Conditions at the Martinique provoked presidential
comment and journalistic outrage; conditions at the Randall Gym formed the
subject of litigation. Although the social services departments of both cities
did shelter homeless families in other lodgings, these two accommodationsthe Martinique and the gym-have become key symbols of our failure to protect our most vulnerable.
There are many Hotel Martiniques. They are called welfare hotels, or
temporary shelters, and if they do not exist in every city or town in this country it is because those who are comfortably and conventionally housed express antipathy towards the residents of such shelters.5 That the housing is

Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1988) (statement of William J. Grinker, Commissioner/Administrator, Human Resources Administration).
By April 30, 1989, the Martinique was emptied of its families. HUMAN RESOURCES
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MONTHLY REPORT:

NEW YORK CITY EMER-

GENCY HOUSING PROGRAM FOR FAMILIES (May, 1989) at 4. By May 31, 1989, of the
4,152 families documented by the Human Resources Administration of the City of
New York as occupying emergency shelter in the five boroughs, 2162 were living in
hotels. Monthly Report at 2, 5. By November, 1989, that number had decreased to
1,780, but the city had significantly increased the number of families moving into one
hotel which had been cited repeatedly for the presence of lead paint. Rimer, Despite
Pledge, Homeless Still in Hotel, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1989, at 29, col. 2.
4. In Walls v. Barry, No. 1372-88, (D.C. Super. Ct. dismissed, Feb. 7, 1989),
plaintiffs, homeless mothers and their children, sued the District for placing them in
commercial hotels, which ejected them at 7:00 or 7:30 a.m. every morning and locked
them out of their rooms until 7:00 or 7:30 p.m. each night. Many of the residentssome infant children, some pregnant women-had nowhere to go during the day.
Some waited with their families in cars, or in the hallways of the hotels. Many suffered
from colds or flu. Id. (Declarations of Maude Coleman, Michele Reese, Sheryl White,
Mary Hodge in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order). After
the court granted plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, District social
services officials transferred families from two of the hotels to the Randall School gymnasium, at the time being used as a shelter for homeless men. For a short period,
families were sharing space with the men on the floor. Pending implementation of a
'phase-out plan," the court allowed defendants to house up to twenty-five families in
this fashion. Walls v. Barry, Preliminary Injunction Order 7 (April 1, 1988). For a description of the early and middle stages of the Walls litigation, and of other litigation
related to shelter for homeless families in the District of Columbia, see Sinclair-Smith
and Minor, Down and Out in D.C.: Homeless Families and the Right to Shelter, 3
WASH. LAWYER 41 (1988).

5. The "NIMBY" ("not in my back yard") reaction to the placement of housing for
groups perceived as undesirable is certainly not limited to "the homeless." However,
particularly graphic examples exist of community opposition to the opening of shelters
for homeless people. One Maryland community recently blocked plans to use vacant
General Services Administration surplus property to build a shelter for homeless fami-
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"temporary" is a fiction: some families have lived in these shelters, five or six
to a single room, for as long as two years.6 The Martinique ultimately is a
metaphor for perversion of purpose. Intended as a luxury hotel for wealthy
travelers, it and its replacements now serve as permanent housing for the
dispossessed, housing that in itself is a perversion of the idea of "home."
The purpose of this article is not to convey the horror of welfare hotels.
Others have done so, far more eloquently than I can hope to. My goal is to
attempt to explain yet another perversion: the transformation of federal welfare policy into housing policy, a mismatch of law and function which must
share the blame for fostering such monstrosities as the Martinique. In part,
this article will describe how two programs under Title IV of the Social Security Act- the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") program and
the Emergency Assistance to Families with Children ("EANFC") program-

lies, pursuant to the provision of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-77, 5502, 101 Stat. 482, 510-11 (1987) which requires the federal
government to make surplus properties available for such purposes. Robinson, Maryland City Residents Seek to Halt Planned Housing for Homeless, Baltimore Sun, June
23, 1989, at D1, col. 2. In an example as colorful as it may be atypical, merchants in
Burlington, Vermont formed a nonprofit association called "Westward Ho!" to offer
one-way plane tickets to homeless men to their original places of residence. Johnson,
Homeless Get Ticket to Leave, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1988, at 52, col. 1. In its guide to
prospective builders of shelter for homeless people, the American Institute of Architects has quoted advice for deflecting community resistance. Recommended strategies include avoiding loaded terms such as "homeless" or "shelter," and substituting
phrases such as "residence," "housing," or "congregate facility" in any description
of the project. N. GREER, THE CREATION OF SHELTER 103 (1988) (quoting

ANELLO

AND

SHUSTER, COMMUNITY RELATIONS STRATEGIES: A HANDBOOK FOR SPONSORS OF COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMS FOR THE HOMELESS).

When such emotions erupt into litigation, often the catalyst is the unwelcome appearance of homeless children in neighborhood schools. Riverhead Central School
District v. Romano, 118 A.D.2d 551, 498 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (school
district sued Suffolk County Commissioner of Social Services for subsidizing longterm placement of homeless families in motel); Complaint at 7, Vinagra v. Borough of
Wrightstown, No. 87-7545 (N.J. Super. Jan. 5, 1988) (after homeless residents of a
motel registered their children in the corresponding school district, the borough ordered the families to vacate the hotel pursuant to a zoning ordinance which limited
hotel occupancy to thirty days). In the sad case of Seide v. Prevost, 536 F.Supp.
1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) the litigation opposed advocates for two outcast groupshomeless men and children residing in state psychiatric institutions- in a struggle for
possession of the waste ground of Ward's Island. See also Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'n v. Cuomo, 651 F.Supp. 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (plaintiff neighborhood association alleged racial discrimination on the part of the city, for placing
disproportionate number of shelters for homeless people in neighborhoods of high
minority concentration).
6. For a discussion of lengths of time during which shelter residents may occupy
"temporary" shelter, see infra notes 124-5, and accompanying text.
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have combined to fund the placement of destitute children in welfare hotels
and barracks-style, congregate shelters.
This transformative process rests on a deliberate mischaracterization.
The public policy that chooses welfare benefits, rather than housing programs, to resolve homelessness relies on a perception of homelessness as
aberrant, and as born of aberrance. As such, the policy treats homelessness
as a fluke, and not as a symptom of structural deficiencies in the housing
market. Thus, homelessness becomes a temporary problem curable by temporary expedients such as emergency grants. The fiction of homelessness
as a "crisis" has justified what has been, up until recently, the continued
failure of federal and state governments to divert the vast sums of money
poured into nightly hotel placements to more productive uses: into building
permanent housing, or into increasing the income available to indigent persons to buy their own accommodations.
This policy failure manifests only the result of a legal value system which
safeguards no economic rights, and which structures hierarchies among economic entitlements. Of necessity, legal advocacy for homeless people has
mirrored these structures, and another purpose of this paper is to describe
this advocacy. For several years, advocates for homeless persons have
looked to welfare law, not housing law, to find shelter for poor people. Scattered state constitutions and statutes impose obligations upon states to provide a minimum level of subsistence for their citizens. Through creative use
of these provisions in state court litigation, advocates have elicited commitments from city governments to expand significantly their supply of overnight
shelter to homeless people. 7 The tangible benefit of this litigation to the plaintiffs has been enormous. But, as advocates for the homeless would be the

7. There are a number of examples of significant "right to shelter" litigation, litigated under state or local statutes or constitutional provisions, and settled under minutely detailed consent decrees. See e.g., Consent Decree 2-3, Graham v. Schoemehl
and the City of St. Louis, No. 854-00035, (Div. No. 2 Nov. 15, 1985) (incorporating
comprehensive program of services for women and families; obligating the city to
provide $310,000 for shelter services in 1985-6, and to open two hundred units of
temporary and one hundred units of permanent housing for homeless people in
1986); Final Judgment by Consent, Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County Aug. 26, 1981) (setting, among others, some of the following standards for
city-operated shelters for homeless men: width of beds; condition of bedding; availability of facilties for storage, laundry and maintenance of personal hygiene; hours of
group recreation; unlimited hours of entrance and exit; mail privileges; and pay telephones). Id. at 3-5. The decree also set standards for showers, security, storage,
cleanliness of bed linens and of the facility generally, and heat for the privately-owned
hotels on the Bowery which the city paid to house homeless men. Id. at 8-9; Paris v.
Board of Supervisors of the County of Los Angeles, Case No. 523361, Consent Decree at 4 (L.A. Cty. Sup. Ct. July 16, 1988) (incorporating extensive standards enunciated in the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services' General Relief
Handbook for safety and cleanliness, and for rights of residents).
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first to admit, the strategies carry some inherent deficiencies.8
First, the obligations imposed through this litigation guarantee survival,
not living, and, at best, extend only to shelter, not housing. The difference is
significant. These scattered provisions in state statutes and constitutions can
at best be interpreted to guarantee residents enough economic security to
survive as transients, not enough to sink roots into the community. 9 Second,
since most of these commitments are embodied in consent decrees, they
form at best a patchwork of successes, and provide no precedent that can be
extended to situations in other communities. 10 Yet, minimal as these state
constitutional provisions are, they do far exceed any federal sources of assertable right. Despite the most optimistic of interpretations,' 1 the United

8. Robert Hayes, whose advocacy under Article XVII of the New York Constitution
compelled the City of New York to spend millions of dollars on sheltering its previously
neglected population of homeless men and women, has described litigation as "the
equivalent of a bull in a china shop." Hayes, Litigating on Behalf of Shelter for the
Poor, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 87 (1987).
9. See supra note 7, on results of several suits settled by consent decree. Of
these suits, plaintiffs in Graham sued under the charter of the city of St. Louis, which
implemented a state-imposed statutory duty to support poor persons. Plaintiffs in Callahan sued under the equal protection clauses of the United States' and New York
State's Constitutions, Amended Complaint at 22-23, Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-72581,
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 1979); under Article XVII of the New York State Constitution and
Section 131, among others, of the New York State Social Services Law, Id. at 23.
Plaintiffs in Paris brought their action under Section 526a of the California Code of Civil
Procedure (allowing taxpayer suits for the wasteful expenditure of public funds),
Amended Complaint at 16, Paris v. Board of Supervisors, No. C 523361 (L.A. Cty.
Sup. Ct. filed June 27, 1986); under Sections 10000 and 17000 of the CA. WELF. INST.
Code (West 1980) and the CA. CONSTIT., Id. at 20.
10. One author has commented on the questionable precedential effect of the consent decree in Callahan, perhaps the most notable litigation to assert a right to shelter
as guaranteed by state constitutional rights to subsistence. McKittrick, The Homeless:
Judicial Intervention on Behalf of a Politically Powerless Group, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.
J. 389, 406 (1988). McKittrick has also noted the tortuous history of efforts to enforce
rights to shelter under the consent decree in Callahan, an exhaustively detailed document invoked repeatedly in subsequent litigation. McKittrick, id. at 413. For Robert
Hayes' rueful description of the history of enforcement of Callahan, see Hayes,
Homelessness and the Legal Profession, 35 LoY. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (1989).
For a description of the efforts to enforce the settlement agreement in Russell v.
Barry, No. 87-2072 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1987), which required the District of Columbia
promptly to provide emergency shelter for homeless families with children, and to
promulgate regulations to control the quality of shelter under D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3601 - 3-607 (1981) (1988 Supp.), The Right to Overnight Shelter Act, see infra notes
243-245 and accompanying text.
11. Several commentators have stated that despite a history of Supreme Court
opinions disclaiming the presence in the Constitution of any guarantees to economic
rights, it is possible to interpret the Constitution as providing substantive due process
rights to subsistence, see Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking
Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 23-30 (1987); Michelman, Welfare Rights in
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States Constitution easily yields no governmental obligation to provide economic security, shelter or housing. 1 2 Advocates in search of a coherent, nationally replicable strategy to expand access to housing for homeless people
are faced with a double bind. Fully aware of the futility of claiming a federal,
and thus national, constitutional right to shelter, advocates must look to state
law sources of right. Yet, even here, advocates will encounter two threshold
dilemmas. First, these sources of law may not always exist.1 3 Second,
where favorable constitutional provisions are available, since the history of
litigation for homeless people has thus far been written in consent decrees,
advocates cannot even point to other court decisions as persuasive, and
must re-invent the wheel time after time in state courts.
Ironically, it is precisely this constellation of programs paying the bills for
the welfare hotels-the public benefits programs contained within the scope
of Title IV-A of the Social Security Act-which provides one of the most inviting sources for the assertion of a statutory right to shelter. There are several
reasons for this. First, unlike federally subsidized housing, receipt of benefits
under either the AFDC or the EANFC program is arguably an entitlement.
Eligibility for federally subsidized housing secures an applicant a space on a
waiting list measured in months or years; 14 eligibility for AFDC is circumscribed only by the exigencies of need of the dependent child, not by the
a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 659 (1979). Professor Michelman
expressed the most optimistic view of the assertability of a right to shelter - before
the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Lindsey v. Normet. (See infra note 12).
Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 207 (1970).
12. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74, (1972) which, in interpreting Oregon's
Forcible Entry and Detainer statute, Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 105.105-105.165 (1984), refuted
any claim to a constitutional guarantee to quality of housing or to a property right in
rental housing, has been viewed as effectively blocking any claim to any fundamental
right to housing or shelter. For examples of such commentary, see Siebert, Homeless
People: Establishing Rights to Shelter, 4 LAW AND INEQUALITY 393, 397 (1986);
Woodward, Homelessness: A Legal Activist Analysis of Judicial and Street Strategies, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS ANN. 251, 269 (1986).
More recent cases from the District of Columbia have accorded extremely limited
due process protections to overnight shelter as an entitlement under the Social Security Act, Caton v. Barry, 500 F.Supp. 45, 48 (D.D.C. 1980), or as an expectation created by continuous occupation of a government-operated shelter, Williams v. Barry,
490 F.Supp. 941, 945 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd in part, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C.Cir. 1983).
13. For an exhaustive list of state statutory and constitutional provisions that impliedly or explicitly provide a right to subsistence; that set eligibility for general (statefunded) relief; or that imply a requirement for the state to protect vulnerable adults
through its adult protective services code, see Langdon and Kass, Homelessness in
America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 305, 362392 (1985).
14. Of twenty-seven cities surveyed in 1988, seventeen had stopped accepting
applications for federally subsidized housing programs because the waiting lists were
too long. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOME-
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Office of Management and Budget. 15 Thus, if a child and her family meet the
financial and other criteria of eligibility for AFDC, they may exercise an absolute claim of statutory right against the state, as conduit for the federal gov/16
ernment, for benefits. Although the scheme of "cooperative federalism"
that governs both the AFDC and EANFC programs allows participating states
significant freedom in setting the dollar amount of monthly payments, and
some latitude in the type of benefits they provide, once a state chooses to
participate, certain uniform federal standards for implementing the programs
apply. Second, although adoption of the AFDC and other relevant programs
under the Act is voluntary, all states participate in the cash benefit part of the7
AFDC program, and thirty jurisdictions participate in the EANFC program.1
This article will discuss the strengths and shortcomings of using strategies which rely on these programs under the Social Security Act to assert a
right to shelter. The strategy has worked unevenly, in part due to the confusing judicial interpretations of states' obligations under the statutes. The
Supreme Court has sent conflicting signals as to whether even the minimal
strictures imposed upon the states in the AFDC program apply to EANFC. As
a consequence of this confusion, many state plans for EANFC combine the
worst of both programs: the extensive personal and financial eligibility requirements for AFDC and -the time-consuming procedures for verifying eligibility; the use of AFDC's penurious and rigid payment levels, meant to apply
to the long-term program of on-going assistance, as a measurement standard
for benefits under the short-term, emergency program; and reliance on the
fiction of temporariness to provide to emergency applicants an arbitrary mixture of in-kind and cash benefits, often unrelated to the actual need.
As I have already suggested, it is this same "fiction of temporariness,"
that is misapplied to homelessness, and that makes litigating for permanent
housing solutions under a temporary benefits program so problematic. The
absence of any coherent federal legislative or judicial guidance for emergency assistance standards has transformed the application process for any
emergency benefit into one as unpredictable as was the emergency itself.
LESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES:

1988, at 64 (Jan. 1989). Chicago housing officials

reported a ten year wait for participation in the city's "Section 8" program. Id. at 68.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 601 was amended in 1956 to substitute for a limited appropriation
an open-ended authorization to expend "Act of Aug. 1, 1956, for each fiscal year a
sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this part." 70 Sat. 848.
16. The Supreme Court first used this oft-repeated phrase in King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 316 (1968) to describe the structure of the federal-state relationship in the
provision of AFDC.
17. For a comprehensive listing of variations in all the states' and territories' AFDC
plans, see the forty-two reports tabulated and compiled under: Family Support Administration, Office of Family Assistance, Department of Health and Human Services,
Automated State AFDC Plans: Reports Based on State Plan Amendments Effective on
or before January 1, 1989 and received by April 1, 1989 (1989) (hereinafter "Automated State AFDC Plans"). Report No. 21 lists the states offering an Emergency
Assistance to Needy Families with Children program as of January 1, 1989.
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State courts and state legislatures have devised their own chaotic answers to
the questions of what sorts of emergency aid states can offer, how they may
define "emergency," and whether they may vary their definitions according
to the identity of the applicant. This is a situation that is peculiarly perilous for
the family seeking the one benefit-housing-for which people need the
greatest assurances of predictability and stability.
The ultimate irrationality in the system reserves itself for those who need
emergency shelter assistance. "Emergency shelter" is a fiction. For many
applicants, the "emergency" which precipitated their homelessness may be
neither tornado nor flood, but family crisis or loss of income; the "emergency" state of homelessness may last not for days, but months. It should
seem obvious that no construction of the term "emergency assistance" can
be compatible with the provision of stable, long-term housing. As I will explain, the federal emergency assistance system has adapted functionally, not
formally, to this paradox. The continuing fantasy of treating dire need for
housing as an "emergency" has exposed the most vulnerable of all applicants to the full force of all the inequities arising from the states' inconsistent
interpretations of the two programs.
One can feel confident that advocates for homeless people would support the basic caveat that should precede this article. Sometimes the wellintentioned efforts to enforce uniform access to emergency shelter under the
Social Security Act, or to nudge up the levels of payment in a benefits program may only seem to perpetuate structures which deny dignity. Advocates
understand this possibility, and acknowledge it as troubling. 18 No one wants
to fight for the "right" of impoverished citizens to live in filthy, temporary
housing of any type. No one wants to fight for the "right" to a monthly income set at a percentage of some state legislature's perception of the minimum necessary to sustain life, which may in turn be only some percentage of
the federal perception of that minimum. The goal of all advocates for homeless people is to become housing advocates; to assert the right of their clients
to live, not on the floor of a church's basement, not in a room at a Holiday Inn,
but in a "home," with all its connotations of permanency, autonomy and
dignity.
18. Robert Hayes has decried his own efforts to expand the supply of emergency
shelter in an outburst of modesty and frustration:
Why in God's name should you go through five years and, if someone is
paying bills, millions of dollars of legal fees to get a relatively modest victory?
And what kind of victory? Come to New York; come see city shelters. A
shelter for men right now has one thousand human beings sleeping in one
room of that shelter. Probably most of you know the scandal of sheltering
homeless families in New York City where $35,000 a year is sqquandered
on a squalid welfare hotel room. If you wanted to find the best way to sabotage some kind of humanitarian response, you come and see the fruits of
these various court injunctions.
Hayes, Homelessness and the Legal Profession, 35 LoY. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989).
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I. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

-

WHO, AND How MANY, ARE

THE HOMELESS HOTEL FAMILIES?

That local governments are housing destitute families temporarily in hotels is nothing new. As early as the early 1970's, litigation highlighted welfare
policies that instead of subsidizing less costly apartments financed expensive
hotel placements. 19 It is unclear that any one factor preceding the first appearance in 1988 of Jonathan Kozol's reports of his investigations into the
Martinique 20 directed public attention to the intensification of the problem of
homeless families- the unavailability of all but the most makeshift, transitory
shelter; the escalation of the costs of providing such shelter; the sheer increase in the numbers of families seeking such assistance. Certainly the title
of one of the first of several congressional investigations into the housing of
families in welfare hotels- "Homeless Families: A Neglected Crisis"- suggested that the scope of the problem had outpaced its notoriety.2 1
It is clear that "the problem"- if by problem, one means increasing
numbers of families housed temporarily, exorbitantly, and squalidly- was
noted as increasing during the 1980's. In its annual survey of twenty-seven
cities, in 1989 the United States Conference of Mayors noted that eighteen
reported an increase in the numbers of families seeking emergency shelter.
The cities surveyed reported that homeless families constituted between 15
and 80% of the homeless population.2 2 Studies seem to concur in singling
out homeless families as the most rapidly growing segment of the homeless
population during the 1980's, representing on a national average between 33
and 40% of that population. 23 A survey conducted on January 22, 1986 of
19. In Washington v. Wyman, 54 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the New York City
Department of Social Services placed plaintiffs in hotels at $1350 per month for two
rooms, rather than pay $295 in rent, because the $295 exceeded the monthly shelter
standard for public assistance. Id. at 269. For a discussion of more recent applications of this policy, see infra notes 197-200, and text. New York City has used its
public assistance funds to finance emergency shelter in commercial accommodations
such as hotels since 1968. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, RE-

PORT TO CONGRESS: USE OF THE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND

AFDC

PROGRAMS TO

PROVIDE SHELTER TO FAMILIES 18 (1989).

20. J. Kozol, A Reporter at Large: The Homeless and Their Children, THE NEW
Jan. 25, 1988, at 65.
21. Comm. on Government Operations, Homeless Families: A Neglected Crisis,
H.R. REP. No. 982, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. (1986).
22. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 14, at 62.

YORKER MAGAZINE,

23. U.S.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE HOTELS: USES, COSTS AND

ALTERNATIVES 19 (1989). In 1985, the GAO noted the "changing nature of the popula-

tion" from one popularly perceived as consisting of itinerant single men, to a more
heterogeneous population consisting in growing part of adolescents and families with
younger children. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELESSNESS: A COMPLEX PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 5 (1985). See also COMMITTEE ON
HEALTH CARE

FOR

HOMELESS

HEALTH AND HUMAN NEEDS 11

PEOPLE,

(1988);

INSTITUTE

OF

MEDICINE,

HOMELESSNESS,

NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS,
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New Jersey's agency caseloads and shelter residents showed that, in all categories- of individuals actually homeless, or of individuals receiving services to prevent homelessness- children constituted the majority of persons
getting help.

24

The perception that many more homeless families were approaching social services departments in search of emergency shelter has seemed most
acute in the past five years. In testimony delivered in March, 1988 to a congressional committee, the commissioner of New Jersey's Department of
Human Services stated that the state had tripled its expenditures for emergency assistance in the preceding year, to meet a tripling in demand. 25 A
sevenfold increase during 1986 in the number of families sheltered, at government expense, in commercial hotels 2 6 prompted the District of Columbia

HOUSING AND HOMELESSNESS 27-28 (1988) (noting a broad range of estimates from
surveys such as those generated by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, but estimating
that an average of between 25% and 33% of homeless persons are homeless as
families). The Interagency Council on the Homeless, the official executive agency
charged under the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 with coordinating services on behalf of homeless people among cabinet departments and federal agencies, reports the low estimate of 9% to 10%. The study qualifies this figure
by noting that it counts only homeless adult family members; when all homeless family
members are counted, the average rises to 23%. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON THE
HOMELESS, A NATION CONCERNED: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
ON THE RESPONSE TO HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA, at 5-8 (1989).
24. G. GIOGLIO AND R. JACOBSEN, HOMELESSNESS IN NEW JERSEY: A STUDY OF
SHELTERS, AGENCIES AND THE CLIENTS THEY SERVE 24 (1986). However, one should

interpret such data cautiously. Figures showing a significant channeling of resources
towards one population may indicate nothing more than that this is the only population
for which such resources exist. For a comprehensive critique of methodologies for
counting homeless people, especially with reference to those which rely on data gathered from service providers, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL:

PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS IN ESTIMATING NUMBERS AND TRENDS 21-22

(1988).
25. New Jersey's expenditures of funds out of the EANFC program, to place families in temporary housing, had risen from nine million to thirty million dollars from 1987
to 1988, with the number of families assisted during that time increasing from five
thousand to sixteen thousand. Use of AFDC Funds for Homeless Families: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, and the Subcomm. on Social Security and
Family Policy of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1988)
(statement of Drew Altman, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Human
Services).
26. H.R. Crawford, D.C. COUNCIL COMM. ON HUMAN SERVICES' REPORT ON BILL 7724, "Emergency Shelter Services for Families Reform Amendments Act of 1987," 2
(1987). In January of 1986, the District of Columbia's Department of Human Services
had placed thirty-nine families in emergency shelter under "open market contracts"
with private commercial hotel and motel owners. By December of 1986, that number
had increased to 245.
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Council to legislate a fifteen day limit on such placements, and a one hundred
and eighty day limit on subsidizing other emergency housing. 27 Although an
increase in dollars spent does not automatically signify a commensurate increase in numbers of families served, the county executive of Westchester
County testified that expenditures for emergency shelter in his jurisdiction had
risen from three quarters of a million dollars in 1983 to a projected 54 million
dollars for fiscal 1988.28 Data from New York City suggest that, for that city
alone, the number of families placed in temporary commercial accommodations peaked in 1987, and is decreasing. 2 9 However, that decrease has resulted from implementation of an articulated policy, prompted by the threat of
withdrawal of federal funds, to move homeless families out of the most notorious welfare hotels. 30 There is no suggestion that the demand, or the need,
has diminished.31

27. Id., at 5-6. The proposed bill, later codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-206.3
(Supp. 1987), required the Mayor to provide, through building, buying or renovation,
enough non-commercial emergency shelter units to make the use of hotels unnecessary. Id., at 5.
28. Use of AFDC Funds for Homeless Families, supra note 25, at 84 (testimony of
Andrew P. O'Rourke, County Executive of Westchester County, New York). O'Rourke
noted that Westchester County sheltered four thousand individuals, of whom eighteen
hundred were children. Id., at 84.
29. For occupancy in hotels in the five boroughs, New York City noted a decrease
from 3512 families in June, 1987 to 2162 families in May of 1989. Human Resources
Administration of the City of New York, supra n. 3, at 5. Occupancy in the city's other
private emergency shelter placements- the "Tier I" barracks-style shelters, had decreased from 495 families in December, 1986 to 430 in May, 1989, id., at 6, and for
the smaller "Tier 11"Family Centers had increased from 500 in June, 1986, when only
six were open, to 1560 families housed in thirty-six centers, in May of 1989. Id., at 7.
For a discussion of litigation concerning the conditions in Tier I shelters, see infra
notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
30. In March, 1988, Mayor Edward Koch testified that the city of New York had
adopted a five year plan to remove all families from welfare hotels by 1992. He cited
the potential loss of $85 million in federal reimbursements from the EANFC program,
under HHS' proposed regulations to limit the time period during which such funds
could be used. Use of AFDC Funds for Homeless Families, supra note 25 at 42-3
(statement of Edward Koch, mayor of the city of New York). The city later accelerated
its timetable, and guaranteed that families would be moved out from the hotels in two,
rather than five years. Homelessness During Winter 1988-1989: Prospects for
Change, supra n.3, at 41 (1988) (statement of William J. Grinker, Commissioner/Administrator, Human Resources Administration). See infra notes 86-92 and
accompanying text, for a description of HHS' abortive attempt to change its regulations in order to limit the use of EANFC funds for hotel placements.
31. One can infer from the well-publicized closure of one hotel in the District of
Columbia that homeless families have been dispersed, but have not disappeared. After seven years of operation with a record of repeated health code violations, violent
crime, and at least one death of an infant by fire, the Capitol City Inn lost its last
residents on November 30, 1989. Emergency issue over the summer of two hundred
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Playing a numbers game with censuses of "the homeless" has become
something of an industry in the last few years.32 The survey conducted by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") in 1984
spawned more controversy and charges of under-counting than it contributed
to any real understanding of the numerical dimensions of the problem.33 The
HUD study represents the lowest count, with a national figure of two hundred
thousand; the high estimate, from the National Coalition for the Homeless, put
the figure at three million. 3 4 As with counting any segment of the population
of homeless people, counting homeless families usually means counting the
families who gain entry to shelters. 35
federal housing vouchers assisted the process, although no data is available on
whether the two hundred families receiving those vouchers were able to find housing
in the private market. Other families were moved into public housing; still others were
evicted. Housing advocates voiced concern that many of the families were simply
being moved to smaller, less visible hotels. C. Spolar, Capitol Inn Sees the Last of
Homeless, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1989, at D1, col. 3; A. Stevens and D. Price, Boy
Killed in Fire at Capitol City Inn, Washington Post, July 2, 1989, at BI,. As of May 8,
1989, a city census of families housed in emergency hotels reported approximately
four hundred families housed, comprised of 490 adults and 1050 children. Telephone
conversation between Matthew Marquis, research assistant, and Sue Marshall,
Mayor's Coordinator for Homelessness for the District of Columbia, July 10, 1989.
These figures represent an increase over the 245 families temporarily housed in 1986,
as noted in H.R.Crawford, supra, note 26, at.2. Litigation recently filed in the District of
Columbia alleges that, despite the enactment of the Emergency Shelter Services for
Families Reform Amendments Act of 1987, supra note 26, the district has persisted in
shuttling families between inadequate hotel placements. Complaint, Fountain v.
Barry, No. 90-CA01503 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 12, 1990).
32. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL, supra at
note 24, ch. 2, "How Sound Are Current Estimates of the Number of Homeless Persons?" at 16-31, for what is primarily an unfavorable assessment of the methodologies used in twenty-seven national and regional censuses of homeless people.
33. HUD Report on Homelessness: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Housing
and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1984); Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Pierce, 814 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
34. For a comparison table on different estimates, see Committee on Health Care
for Homeless People, supra note 23, at 3. Controversy already surrounds the Bureau
of the Census' plans for counting homeless people in the 1990 census. The special
count, which will occur on March 20 and 21, 1990, will begin in the evening at shelters
and hotels, will continue in the early morning hours to the streets, and will end with a
canvas of abandoned buildings. See Berke, Girding for Bid to Count Homeless, N. Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 1988, at B6, col. 1; Homelessness in America - The Need for Permanent Housing, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 10 1st Cong., 1st
Sess. 748-762 (1989) (testimony of William P. Butz, Assoc. Director for Demographic
Programs, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce).
35. One useful statistic, rarely kept, is the number of families or individuals turned
away from shelters due to lack of bed space. Certainly statistics which premise the
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It is even more difficult to determine how many families are being placed
in commercial housing of last resort, and at whose expense. In terms of cold
numbers, from FY 1985 to FY 1988, the number of cases in which the federal
government provided funding for emergency assistance increased by over a
third. 36 These figures, however, do not indicate what these "cases" could
have been. Many emergency situations, such as utility shut-off or eviction,
can elicit the spending of federal emergency assistance money. Some jurisdictions which do not participate in the EANFC program pay for emergency
hotel placements as a "special need," an extraordinary outlay allocated
within the structure of the AFDC grant.37 In addition, local social services
departments can tap other federal funding sources to pay for temporary comnumber of homeless families on the number of families served in temporary shelters
miss this unknown proportion of the population. An old study indicated an average of
189 persons in Maryland turned away per night by shelter providers during fiscal
1985, with a mismatch between the type of facilities available and the needs of the
persons applying. HEALTH AND WELFARE COUNCIL OF CENTRAL MARYLAND, WHERE
Do You Go FROM NOWHERE 36 (1986). One recent study of "street people" in the

District of Columbia attempted to compensate for the inaccuracies inherent in any
survey confined to shelter residents. Data for this study were collected through interviews held during February and March of 1988, with individuals at eighteen indoor
and outdoor soup kitchens in the District. K.
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 10, 16 (1989).

DOCKETT,

STREET HOMELESS PEOPLE IN

36. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Family Assistance,
"Emergency Assistance: Number of Cases, Fiscal Year 1985" (revised June 16,
1986) notes the average number of cases as 32,500; the same document for fiscal
year 1988 (revised April 10, 1989) notes 45, 872. There are a number of problems
with using these tables. They do not differentiate among the many types of federal
assistance, which may include special needs payments made out of the AFDC program as well as emergency grants made out of the EANFC program. They also do not
indicate whether the numbers represent current active caseload or numbers of cases
opened, or whether the numbers mask repeated requests for assistance from the
same applicants.
37. For example, Connecticut does not participate in the EANFC program. See
Automated State AFDC Plans, supra note 17, Report No. 21 (1989). However, from
July of 1987 through June of 1988, through its special needs program under AFDC,
the state did spend six million dollars on temporary shelter. Department of Health and
Human Services, Use of the Emergency Assistance and AFDC Programs to Provide
Shelter to Families 15-16 (1989). 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23)(1985), as currently implemented by 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2)(i)(1988), impliedly requires states to specify the
standards by which they determine AFDC recipients' need and payments;
§ 233.20(a)(2)(v)(1988) mandates description of any special needs items. During the
late 1960's and early 1970's, virtually all AFDC jurisdictions changed from using
highly individualized systems, by which individuals received separate grants according to specific needs, to systems of disbursing uniform consolidated grants. Despite
this change, most states retained some provision for small, occasionally in-kind or
vendor-paid grants, to cover particularized, extraordinary needs. This transition is described in

HANDLER,

LAST RESORTS: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND SPECIAL NEEDS

PROGRAMS IN PUBLIC WELFARE 23-24 (1983).

See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
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mercial shelter.3 8 The Government Accounting Office has acknowledged difficulty in retrieving data concerning the extent to which cities rely on hotel
placements as a major source of transitory housing, as well as the extent
to
39
which cities draw on any of the federal sources to pay for that housing.
II.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

-

WHAT CAUSES FAMILIES TO

BE HOMELESS?

As a recent compendium has suggested, studies of why families seek
temporary shelter are primarily anecdotal, limited to small samples, and scattered in terms of the geographic areas they cover.4 ° The events preceding
the move to shelter of last resort vary tremendously. One study of families in
New York City's hotel and congregate shelters posited several major precipitating events. These included involuntary displacement- the sudden loss of
housing due to eviction or fire- as well as nominally discretionary choices to
move to avoid economic difficulties with rent or to escape physically unsafe
conditions.4 1 A preliminary report of findings from interviews of residents of
family shelters in Boston contradicted the New York findings. None of the 51

397, 416-417 (1970) describing the history of New York state's conversion from an
individualized to a flat grant program.
38. These sources include funds allocated to states through the Community Services Block Grant Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1397 etseq.; money allocated to local boards
through the Emergency Food and Shelter Grant Program under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and the Emergency Shelter Grants Program, administered through HUD. The latter two programs are funded through the Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, P.L. No. 100-77, as re-authorized through the
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Amendments Act of 1988, P.L. 100-628.

See also U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE HOTELS: USES, COSTS
AND ALTERNATIVES, at 36-45 (1989); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, USE OF THE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND AFDC PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE SHELTER
TO FAMILIES

39. U.S.

16 (1989).
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE HOTELS: USES, COSTS AND

ALTERNATIVES,

supra note 38, at 17. The picture can be somewhat complicated in the

case of a state such as New York, whose jurisdictions may channel their funding for

emergency hotel placements through two Title IV-A programs. The GAO report notes
that 95% of New York City's emergency hotel placements are paid as special needs
grants out of AFDC. Id. at 38. However, the Department of Health and Human Services notes that, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1988, close to a third of the sixty-six
million dollars spent by the federal government for emergency shelter assistance for
New York state was channeled through the EANFC program; only four million dollars
came through AFDC special needs. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, USE OF THE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND

AFDC

PROGRAMS To PROVIDE SHEL-

16 (1989).
40. Committee on Health Care for Homeless People, supra note 23, at 11.

TER TO FAMILIES

41. J. MOLNAR, HOME IS WHERE THE HEART Is: THE CRISIS OF HOMELESS CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES IN NEW YORK CITY; A REPORT TO THE EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION

20 (1988).
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mothers interviewed had arrived in the shelter as a result of a cataclysmic,
unpredictable event. Rather they had lost their housing for a complicated
combination of reasons, including the breakdown of fragile systems of familial and economic supports.4 2 Another study, a one year survey covering
eighteen family shelters in the southeastern United States, including interviews with 124 female heads of household, cited personal crisis generated
by domestic violence or substance abuse as a factor precipitating homelessness for seventy percent of the interviewees. Other women interviewed in the
study had been evicted as a result of the loss of their public benefits, and,
consequently, of their rent money.4 3
Some studies of homeless families concentrate on the characteristics of
the interviewees: their race or ethnicity; their educational background; their
personal and behavioral problems; their psychological profiles, and the psychological profiles of their children. Again, geographical demographic disparities, problems in the execution of surveys, and the myriad number of
variables that can account for the residential composition of any family shelter, make generalization unwise. 44 In one report of her study of eighty families housed in shelters in the Los Angeles area, Dr. Kay McChesney implicitly
eschewed any quantified demographic analysis of the population, and instead adopted a descriptive mechanism of "typologies," admittedly unstatistical generalizations about the residents' economic and familial backgrounds.4 5 Nonetheless, from some of the studies, however impressionistic
the data, some patterns seem to emerge.
One study of New York City's family shelters found 95% of the occu42. Bassuk, The Feminization of Homelessness: Families in Boston Shelters, 7
AM. J. OF Soc. PSYCHIATRY 19, 21 (1987).

43. P. Dail, A Psycho-Social Portrait of Homeless Women with Children: Implications for Social Intervention Programs 6 (unpub. paper presented at the American
Psychological Association's Conference on Reaching the Unreachable, Washington,
D.C., May, 1988).
44. For example, in one of a series of reports on a study interviewing first residents
of Boston shelters for families, then residents of shelters outside the city, and then a
control group of housed families, Dr. Ellen Bassuk noted that her inability to gain access to a shelter which housed primarily Hispanic families probably resulted in an
undercount of Hispanic homeless families. Bassuk and Rosenberg, Why Does Family
Homelessness Occur? A Case-Control Study, 78 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 783 (1988).
Another team describing the results of a survey of residents of a Salvation Army family
shelter in St. Louis noted that the origin of the shelter as a treatment center for entire
families could partially account for the high proportion of children under five in the
residential population. Hutchison, Searight and Stretch, Multidimensional Networking:
A Response to the Needs of Homeless Families, 31 SOCIAL WORK 427 (1986).
45. The Crisis in Homelessness; Effects on Children and Families, 1987: Hearing
before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth and Families, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 175, 177 (1987) (written submission of article, Paths to Family Homelessness,
by K. Young McChesney, Director, USC Homeless Families Project, Social Science
Research Institute, University of Southern California at Los Angeles).
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pants to be black or Hispanic, with 83% of the residents reporting public
assistance to be their source of income.4 6 Dr. Ellen Bassuk's reports on her
study of family shelters in Massachusetts describe two-thirds of the residents
as being black or Hispanic, 4 7 with 60% having received AFDC for more than
two years,4 8 and 96% currently receiving public assistance.4 9 The predominance of minority families and of AFDC as an income source in these shelters
may be a regional characteristic. In her study of family shelters in the southeast, Dr. Paula Dail found two-thirds of the occupants to be white, with only
28% of them receiving AFDC as their primary income.5 ° In terms of other
demographics, the New York and Massachusetts studies found the majority
of the heads of household to be female, with the average or median age of
the female household head to be 27. Between 25% and 40% of the household heads had completed high school. Between 50% and 65% of the children housed in the shelters were under the age of five.5 1
Pervasive among the impressions is one of domestic rootlessness as a
prelude to homelessness. Bassuk reported a pattern of residential instability
in her interviewees: most had moved three or four times during the year preceding their entry into temporary shelter, and 85% had shared living quarters
with another family.52 Half of the women interviewed in Dail's study had lived
with relatives or friends before they moved into emergency housing, and
60% had lived in emergency shelter before. 53 Just under half of the interviewees in the New York study had lived somewhere other than in an apartment of their own during an entire two year period before their move into a
shelter.5 4
Of these authors, Bassuk has most openly asserted a claim of connection between patterns of personal instability and homelessness. In her attempt to hypothesize causes of family homelessness, based on a comparison

46. J.R.

DuMPSON,

A

SHELTER IS NOT A HOME: REPORT OF THE MANHATTAN BOR-

OUGH PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON HOUSING FOR HOMELESS FAMILIES, at 16 (1987).

47. Bassuk and Rosenberg, supra note 44, at 783.
48. Bassuk and Rubin, Homeless Children: A Neglected Population, 57 AM. J. OF
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 279, 281 (1987). The findings in this study were taken from interviews of 82 families, with 156 children, housed in family shelters in Massachusetts.
49. Bassuk and Rosenberg, supra note 44, at 784.

50. P. Dail, supra note 43, at 5-6.
51. J.R. Dumpson, supra note 46, at 16; Bassuk and Rubin, supra note 48, at 281;
Hutchison, Searight and Stretch, supra note 44, at 427.
52. Bassuk and Rosenberg, supra note 44 at 784.
53. P. Dail, supra note 43, at 5-6.
54. J.R. Dumpson, supra note 46, at 18. Data from the Urban Family Center, a
part of the Henry Street Settlement in New York City, indicates that residents suffered
both residential and personal upheavals immediately before their descent into emergency shelter: doubling up, eviction, frequent moves, deaths, unemployment, serious
illnesses, and estrangements. Phillips, Kronenfeld and Jeter, A Model of Services to
Homeless Families in Shelters, in HOUSING THE HOMELESS 322, 323-4 (Erickson and
Wilhelm eds. 1986).
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of demographically similar homeless and housed families, she found that the
most significant differences between the two groups concerned the dependability of close personal or family relationships. Far fewer of the homeless
women could name, or lived near, supportive adult relatives or friends; more
of the homeless women mentioned physically abusive relationships with
spouses or boyfriends as part of their pasts, with their most recent partners
experiencing major problems with substance abuse, or unemployment. 5 5 In
one intriguing finding, she rejected the proposition that homeless female
heads of families constitute a sub-group of a "culture of poverty." Although
most of her homeless interviewees did depend on welfare for their income,
far fewer of them had relied on welfare for as long as had their housed counterparts, or had grown up in welfare-dependent households. 56 One conclusion seems to be that, for at least these subjects, the great constant is lack of
constancy-no constant relationships, no constant source of income, no constant address. Without predictability or cohesiveness, the "culture of homelessness" is no culture at all.
In other writings, Bassuk goes further, linking homelessness to this condition of emotional and economic rootlessness. She urges the establishment,
not only of housing units, but of transitional housing facilities, accompanied
by social services, to ease the movement of families who are temporarily
housed into the community of those who are permanently housed. The assumption is that, in varying degrees, homeless families are dysfunctional, and
unable to re-integrate themselves into housed society without assistance.57
The assumption is by no means Dr. Bassuk's alone. That the only recent
major federal legislation to address homelessness-the Stewart B. McKinney
Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 and its 1988 revision-couples its only
housing initiative with "supportive services" reflects the view that homeless
families need rehabilitation in order to occupy "housing," rather than
58
"shelter."

55. Bassuk and Rosenberg, supra note 44, at 785. Bassuk did note that a greater
proportion of the sample of homeless women reported a history of substance abuse
or psychiatric problems. Id. Other researchers have focused on how personal crisis
dominates the lives of homeless women with families. See Axelson and Dail, The
Changing Character of Homelessness in the United States, 37 FAMILY RELATIONS 463,
465 (1988); Hutchison, Searight and Stretch, supra note 44, at 427.
56. Bassuk and Rosenberg, supra note 44, at 787. Bassuk noted in the same
analysis that her homeless interviewees seemed generally to take less advantage of
all entitlements and social services than did the housed interviewees. Id.
57. Bassuk, Redefining Transitional Housing for Homeless Families, 6 YALE L.&
POLY REV. 309, 314-6 (1988).
58. The three major shelter or housing initiatives created in the 1987 Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act were the Emergency Shelter Grants (ESG), the
Supportive Housing, and the Supplemental Assistance to Facilities to Assist the
Homeless (SAFAH) programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 11373(a); 42 U.S.C. § 11382(7); and
42 U.S.C. § 11392(a); as amended, respectively, by §§ 421, 441, and 461, of P.L. No.
100-628 (1988).
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To describe the characteristics of families in shelter- characteristics arguably molded or induced by the very physical hardships inherent in the shelter placements-risks blurring the line between characteristics and causes.
These studies concur in concluding that instability of place precedes entry
into shelter. They seem, superficially, to present different reasons for the instability. However, all concur in the presence of one factor in the conglomeration of the many that may precipitate homelessness: the complete absence
of any affordable alternatives in the private housing market when precarious
housing situations fall apart. I do not intend this paper to be a disquisition on
the causes and characteristics of the shortage in low-rent housing. Nonetheless, a brief summary of the explanation for why housing is difficult to retain,
or, once lost, to regain, will demonstrate the inappropriateness and ineffectiveness of treating homelessness as a momentary problem, remediable
through temporary expedients.
"Affordability" is a complicated concept, combining considerations of
supply and income; what is "affordable" depends in large part on the expectation of what percentage of income should be spent on housing. For all
renters, that percentage has increased substantially in the last few years,
from 20% in 1970 to 29% of median income in 1983. 59 For low income
renters, the percentage is much higher: of the 5.4 million renters who paid
more then 60% of their income for utilities and rent, 95% of those individuals
had annual incomes under $15,000.60

Several factors obviously contribute to any analysis of why low income
families must divert increasingly large portions of their incomes to housing
costs. One factor is a decrease over the last ten years in the number of rental
units affordable to persons living on low, fixed incomes- whether that affordability results from low market rents, or the lowering of high market rents
through federal subsidy or direct federal supply of housing units. One wellpublicized reason for the loss of low rent units is the sharply decreased federal financial commitment to rental subsidies. The figures are stark: from
1980 and 1981, the last years of the Carter Administration's budgets, to
1982, funding levels for subsidized housing assistance fell from 26.6 and
24.9 billion dollars to 13.2 billion, with the number of additional assisted
households decreasing over that time period by 70%. In 1983 and 1984,
President Reagan actually attempted to rescind housing appropriations previously voted by Congress. 6 ' The administration's FY 1990 housing budget
request increased the 1989 level of funding for housing subsidies from 7.4 to
7.5 billion dollars, but eliminated all funding for construction of public housing, removed funding from the Section 8 existing housing subsidy,6 2 and

59. C. DOLBEARE, Low INCOME HOUSING NEEDS 1 (1987).

60. Id. at 2.

61. Homelessness in America - The Need for Permanent Housing, supra note 34,
at 485.
62. "Section 8" refers to § 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5301
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doubled the funding allocated for housing vouchers. The FY 1990 request
reduced rural housing assistance by 77.5%, and cut or eliminated assistance
under most programs under the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act.6 3
Shrinking federal involvement explains the decrease in the numbers of
new households assisted every year. Other factors also contribute to the
overall disappearance of affordable units from the rental market. One such
factor is the demolition of rental units, or the conversion of rental units into
ownership units. 64 Another is the acceleration under the Reagan administration of the shift in housing policy from constructing housing units to subsidizing the rents on existing units.6 5 A third source for the loss of units results
from the expiration of the twenty-year rent restrictions placed on low income
housing units constructed under Section 221(d)(3) of the Housing Act of
1961, and Section 236 of the Housing Act of 1968.66 One commentator has
estimated that 331,705 of these units are subject to the expiration of the use
restriction by 1995, with another 727,878 built under the more recent Section
8 construction programs due to expire by 2025. This total of over a million
federally subsidized rental units represents about a quarter of the total federally subsidized rental housing stock.6 7
The phased departure of the federal government from the process of
(1987), 24 C.F.R. § 882 (1988), under which an eligible renter receives a "certificate"
for housing in the private market, with the federal government paying the difference
between the landlord's rent, subject to pre-set regional limits, and thirty percent of the
tenant's adjusted income. For a description of the initiation of this program, see
Mitchell, Historical Overview of Direct Federal Housing Assistance, in FEDERAL HousING POLICY AND PROGRAMS, PAST AND PRESENT 201 (J.P. Mitchell ed. 1985).

63. Homelessness in America - The Need for Permanent Housing, supra note 34,
at 490-491.
64. Between 1973 and 1983, 4.5 million units, approximately half of which were
rented to low-income households, were lost from the rental housing market. NATIONAL HOUSING TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE, at 6, reprinted in Hearings

before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 134, 142 (1988).
65. J.P. Mitchell, supra note 62, at 203.
66. See id. at 198-199 for a description of these programs. Under the § 221(d)(3)
program, the government provided what were in effect direct, below market interest
rate (BMIR) loans to private developers. Under § 236, the government subsidized to
developers the difference between the market mortgage rate and one percent. Under
both programs, an initial condition of assistance was that developers maintain below
market rents for twenty years, after which point they could pre-pay their remaining
mortgage debt and extinguish their obligation.
67. 1,352,000 units consist of public housing, which is owned by local governmental housing authorities and not subject to any changing use restrictions. P.L. CLAY, AT
RISK OF Loss: THE ENDANGERED

FUTURE

OF Low-INCOME RENTAL HOUSING RE-

SOURCES 7-11 (2d. printing 1987). For a summary of how changing federal policy,
market forces, and expiration of use restrictions have contributed to the decline in
availability of low-rent housing, see McDougall, Affordable Housing for the 1990's, 20
U. MICH. L. REV. 727, 755-762 (1987).
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increasing the quantity of low-rent housing units correlates to one statistic:
that barely 20% of the poorest of poor families enjoys the benefit of any federal housing subsidy. Of the 3.7 million families assisted by AFDC, 63% live
in private sector housing; 9.9% live in public housing, and 9.8% live in federally subsidized rental units. 68 From 1974 to 1987, the number of rental
households with income below $5,000 which received no housing assistance
increased from 2.2 million to 3.2 million.69
These figures are crucial. What they mean is that only 20% of families
receiving AFDC can depend on paying no more than 30% of their income on
rent, the maximum set under the federal subsidy programs for lower income
families. For the rest, market forces dictate that they will spend crippling portions of their incomes on rent. This is exactly what has happened. According
to the National Housing Task Force, by 1983, six million, or almost half, of
low income housholds (defined as receiving incomes of $10,000 a year or
less), paid more than half of their incomes for rent, compared with 3.7 million
such households in 1975.70 For single parent families, the group eligible for
assistance under AFDC and EANFC, the rent burden has always been disproportionately onerous, and has increased, from 34.9% of income in 1974 to
58.4% in 1987.71
Federal subsidies do more than provide rents that are affordable; they
assure rents that are predictable. Housing subsidy programs insulate impoverished families living on fixed incomes from fluctuations in rents in the private market-increases of some 300% in the median rent between 1970 and
1983.72 Accompanying this rapid increase in rents is a significant decrease
in the ability of welfare-dependent families to pay for them. When payment
levels were evaluated in adjusted dollars, only two AFDC jurisdictions
showed increases in their payment levels between 1970 and 1989; the median state decreased its AFDC payments over that period by 37%.73 The
elasticity of rents, and the inelasticity (in reality, the negative elasticity) of welfare income, suggest that access to a rent-subsidized apartment or house
may be the only guarantee of stable, affordable housing costs for a welfaredependent family. Another, related issue, which complicates the housing pic68. FAMILY SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE: CHARACAFDC RECIPIENTS, FY 1987, 35 (1987).
69. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF

TERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF

THE NATION'S HOUSING, 1988, at 18 (1988).
70. NATIONAL HOUSING TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIVE, supra note 64, at 6.
71. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, supra note 69,

at 14.
72. The national median rent increased from $108 in 1970 to $315 in 1983; during
that same period, the number of units renting for less than $80 per month decreased
from 5.5 million to 650,000. Wright and Lam, Homelessness and the Low Income
Housing Supply, 17 Soc. POL. 48, 49 (1987).
73. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., 1ST SESS.,
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 546-547 (Comm. Print 1989).
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ture even for families fortunate enough to receive precious federal housing
subsidies, is scarcity of any rental housing, or scarcity of housing at a rent
which HUD will subsidize.7 4
A comparison of AFDC grants in some states with what HUD assesses
as "fair market rents" ("FMR") in portions of those states is illuminating. In
Massachusetts, the maximum, statewide AFDC grant for a family of three is
$539; in the District of Columbia it is $393; in Alabama, it is $118.
HUD's
current FMR for a two bedroom apartment in Massachusetts range from a
low of $488 in the western part of the state to a high of $810 in Boston; the
FMR for a two bedroom is $695 in the District; and it ranges from $237 to
$410 in Alabama. 76 The HUD FMR is a crude gauge of housing costs. But
one certainty in the economics of housing and welfare is that rents charged
by the private sector will continue to rise, while incomes provided by the public sector will not. The litigation which I will describe briefly at the end of this
paper addresses this issue. It is a strategy that recognizes the gulf between
housing costs and income resources; recognizes that that gulf can only be
bridged by the provision of more housing or more income; and chooses to
attack the problem by asserting that state government has an obligation to
provide more income. But, even when successful, such litigation is premised
primarily on state law, and provides no national solution. For that, a renewed
commitment to housing subsidies and to increased supply remains the only
meaningful answer.
As Chester Hartman has reminded us, housing is in fact a commodity
like no other: it is indivisible, immovable, and it gobbles money. Whether
74. In its study of HUD's two major housing subsidy programs, the housing
voucher program [42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)] (1989 supp.) and the Section 8 certificate
program [42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)](1989 supp.), the General Accounting Office compared the rental housing markets in the Houston and New York metropolitan areas. In
Houston, the GAO investigators found plentiful rental housing at rates well below the
FMRs set by HUD. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RENTAL HOUSING: HOUSING
VOUCHERS COST MORE THAN CERTIFICATES 33 (1989). Conversely, in the New York

area, investigators found that while New York City units rented within the FMR, units
overall were scarce; in the metropolitan counties, actual rents exceeded FMRs. Id. at
38. During fiscal 1986 and 1987, only 32% of the Section 8 certificate holding tenants
and 34% of the voucher-holding tenants in New York City were able to find housing
they could use. The rates of success in finding acceptable apartments were higher in
the surrounding counties. Id at 40.
75. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,

101ST CONG., 1ST SESS.,
MATERIALS AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 541 (1989).
BACKGROUND

76. For the Massachusetts figures, see 54 Fed. Reg. 39888, 39890 (1989); for the
District of Columbia, 54 Fed. Reg. 39874 (1989); for Alabama, 54 Fed. Reg. 39868
(1989). HUD fair market rents are set at the 45th percentile of market rents. HUD
publishes these standards as a basis for determining the payments it will make to
landlords under the Section 8 housing programs and the housing voucher program.
54 Fed. Reg. 39866 (1989).
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one rents or buys, one must amass savings that far exceed monthly income
in order to tender a security deposit or downpayment. Whether it goes toward a rent or a mortgage payment, the monthly check mailed for the privilege of remaining in occupancy again claims a major portion of income.
Moreover, that payment cannot be apportioned, budgeted into other needs,
or delayed.7 7
These basic characteristics of housing make providing for it through income supplements, such as emergency assistance or special needs grants,
extremely problematic for two reasons. First, it is clear that the sudden loss
of housing is always a risk for a low income family. This is an inflexible good,
which poor people cannot afford to buy, and, increasingly, cannot afford to
rent. When 60% of income must go into housing costs, any upset in the
fragile balance of family finances, such as the incurrence of unexpected medical costs, may infringe upon that 60% and make paying the next month's
rent impossible. The result is indeed an "emergency," but only if one conceives of emergency as a potentially infinitely recurring condition. Second, to
re-locate a homeless family using an emergency grant requires a high level of
expenditure- typically, the double payment of first month's rent plus security
deposit. This one-time infusion of money may constitute a reasonable use for
an emergency assistance grant, but it is useful only if the state's emergency
assistance allocations allow the full amount of the expense to be met. As we
will see in a later discussion of variations in state emergency assistance
grants, states are perfectly free to limit emergency assistance and special
needs grants to levels wholly inadequate for this purpose.

III.

EMERGENCY AS NORMALCY- How EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE
CAME TO PAY THE RENT, OR, "AND I WONDER WHY
SOMEBODY DOESN'T BUILD THEM A HOUSE FOR
'
$37,000? 78

How much does it cost? "Millions" leaves us blase, but numbers in an
individual case still retain the power to shock. In 1987, New York City spent
an average of $125.86 per day to maintain a family of four in barracks-style
shelter, and an average of $91.95 per day for sheltering in a hotel.7 9 The bill
in Westchester County, New York for a single room in the Fox Ridge Motor
77. C. Hartman, The Housing Part of the Homelessness Problem, in THE MENTAL
HEALTH NEEDS OF HOMELESS PERSONS

73 (E. Bassuk ed. 1986).

78. Use of Emergency Assistance Funds for Acquisition of Temporary and
Permanent Housing for Homeless Families: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Public
Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986) (statement of Charles E. Schumer,
representive from the state of New York, quoting transcript of statements by President
Ronald Reagan at a press conference held Nov. 19, 1986).
79. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE HOTELS: USES COSTS AND
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 23, at 32 (citing the New York City Mayor's Advisory Task

on the Homeless).
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Inn, which may shelter any number of family members, is $3,750 per
month. 80 When the District of Columbia finally removed its homeless families
from the Capitol City Inn, it did so only after seven years of subsidizing the
owner to the tune of ten million dollars.8 1 Sometimes the jurisdictions cannot
even keep track of the amounts. The District has lost significant sums in federal reimbursement for its emergency 8shelter
expenditures, because it could
2
not document where the money went.
The mechanism by which private hotel, motel, and dormitory operators
have gorged themselves has been fairly simple. States have manipulated the
Title IV-A programs to provide almost unlimited payments to commercial hotels and congregate shelters, payments for which the federal government
provides almost unlimited reimbursement. As described below,8 3 the EANFC
program limits the funding of assistance to thirty days within a twelve month
period. The regulations implementing the law are a good deal more expansive: they allow for allocation of funds to cover obligations or needs incurred
during any thirty day period. 84 It is under this provision that some cities have
committed themselves to long-term contracts with private providers of hotel
and barracks-style shelter. Funding of hotel rooms under an AFDC special
needs grant carries no specific time limitation, but is limited in other ways: the
grant by definition is restricted to applicants already receiving or applying for
AFDC, and theoretically can be deducted from future regular grant payments. 8 5 In practice, states have also used the AFDC special needs mechanism to pay for long-term "temporary" shelter.
The impetus for cities such as New York to move families from hotels to
more apartment-like accommodations came as much from an agency threat
to close this loophole as from any humanitarian motive. On December 14,
1987, the Family Support Administration published proposed regulations to

80. Henry, Homeless Families in "Welfare Motels" Want Them Closed, 10
L. NEWS 12 (July-Aug. 1989).
81. Requiem for a Hellhole, Wash. Post, Dec. 2, 1989, at A18, col. 1.
82. U.S.

YOUTH

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE HOTELS: USES, COSTS AND

supra note 38, at 34.
83. See infra notes 126-142 and accompanying text for description of the EANFC
program, its reimbursement formula, and the reimbursement formula for Title IV-A
special needs grants. The time-limiting language of 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) provides less
than a model of clarity, and has generated litigation; see infra note 174 and accompanying text.
84. 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(b) reads in part:
(b) Federal financial participation ....
•
(3) Federal matching is available only for emergency assistance which
the State authorizes during one period of 30 consecutive days in any 12
consecutive months, including payments which are to meet needs which
arose before such 30-day period or are for such needs as rent which
extend beyond the 30-day period... (italics added).
85. For a discussion of problems with special needs grants as emergency assistance payments, see infra note 168 and accompanying text.
ALTERNATIVES,
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restrict use of EANFC funds to one thirty day period within a twelve month
period, to prohibit states from paying more for hotels than for other kinds of
housing under special needs grants, and to require states to set maxima for
assistance in both programs. 8 6 The agency's rationale was simple: emergency assistance expenditures had risen 65% in the preceding four years, 87
and by categorizing hotel assistance as a different special need from a shelter allowance, some jurisdictions had been billing the federal government for
reimbursement at rates varying between $270 and $1470 a month. 88
The proposed regulation lasted, at best, a week. Politicians and social
services agencies panicked, and issued grim prognostications about cuts in
funds. New York officials predicted that the state would lose $85 million in
shelter supplements over the following year if the proposed regulations were
approved. 89 On December 21, in Section 9118 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Congress forbade the Secretary of Healtb and Human
Services to implement the December 14 regulation before October 1, 1988.90
After the initial calamity was averted, the pressure continued. In a congressional hearing held the following March, governors, senators, congresspersons, mayors, county executives, directors of state and county social
services departments, attorneys, and even a few homeless people decried
the callousness of the temporarily moribund regulation, and emphasized that,
contrary to what HHS stated in its preface to the proposed regulation, at present, no realistic alternative to welfare-funded emergency shelter existed. The
message was conveyed. Congress has extended its moratorium on implementation of the EANFC and special needs restrictions through October 1,
1990.91
This may be the final extension. The provision does allow regulations to
take effect before October 1 which will incorporate HHS' recommendations to
Congress, as contained in a study mandated in Section 902(b) of Pub. L.
86. 52 Fed. Reg. 47422 (1987).
87. Id. at 47421.
88. Id. at 47420.
89. And from the political point of view of any federal legislator, the headlines had
to look none too good. For example, see May, U.S. To Reduce Shelter Funds for
Homeless: New York City Impact Is Said to be $70 Million, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,
1987, p. 33.
90. H.R. , 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H12192 (daily ed. Dec. 21,
1987).
91. See, Use of AFDC Funds for Homeless Families: Joint Hearing before the
House Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the
Comm. on Ways and Means, and the Senate Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988). Congress used
the McKinney re-authorization act to amend OBRA of 1987, to extend the prohibition
through Sept. 30, 1989. 42 U.S.C. § 1383c (1987), as amended by Act of Nov. 7,
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-628, § 901 (102 Stat. 3224, 3257). § 8005 of the OBRA of
1989 further extends the prohibition until Oct. 1, 1990. H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H9438 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989).
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100-628, the 1988 extension of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act. 92 These recommendations resemble the old proposed rule in their
time limitations on the use of emergency assistance funds. But they diverge
in several important areas. They allow the use of EANFC money to pay the
first month's rent and security deposit- an expenditure arguably allowable
under the thirty day limitation anyway, but never explicitly so stated- and
permit states to set different special needs rates for different kinds of
shelter.9 3
That expenditures in these amounts could be productively diverted to the
supplementation of rents, or even to the creation of new housing units, has
not passed everyone's notice. AFDC and its regulations contain no provisions for funding capital projects. 94 Several proposals have involved amending Title IV-A explicitly to allow the allocation of AFDC funds for capital
costs. 9 5 Some counties have not waited for legislative change. One recent
newspaper article has described ventures in Westchester County, New York,
in which private landlords designate some units as "emergency shelter" in
order to qualify the state and county for federal emergency reimbursement.
With the excess (and excessive) funds, the private owners agree to renovate,
to pay off their mortgages, and consequently to operate the buildings as lowrent housing.9 6
One measure targeted specifically at emergency assistance is noteworthy, because of its original inclusion in the omnibus 1987-88 reform of the
92. H.R. 3299, supra note 86.
93. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, USE OF THE EMERGENCY
ASSISTANCE AND AFDC PROGRAMS To PROVIDE SHELTER TO FAMILIES 26 (1989).
94. Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 172, 200 (1962) (presently codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1319) added to Title XIII of the Social Security Act a provision allowing federal finan-

cial participation of up to $500 for repairs made to the home of an AFDC recipient, if
such repairs were necessary to make the home habitable.

95. See, e.g., Homeless Families: A Neglected Crisis, House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1986) (recommending that Congress
amend Title I of the Social Security Act to allow emergency assistance funds to be
used for the purchase, construction and rehabilitation of emergency shelters); H.R.
4938, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Use of Emergency Assistance Funds for

Acquisition of Temporary and Permanent Housing for Homeless Families, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 18-19 (1986) (amending the definition of "emergency assistance for needy

families with children" at 42 U.S.C. § 606(e), to include site acquisition, construction
and renovation); Use of AFDC Funds for Homeless Families, Joint Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means and the Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy
of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (testimony of Andrew
Cuomo, President, HELP, Inc., including text of proposed 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(40).
which would allow states under their AFDC plans to pay non-profit entities to house
homeless persons).

96. Schmitt, Suburbs Trying Alternatives to Hotels for Their Homeless, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
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AFDC program. This provision would have granted money to states with high
welfare hotel caseloads in order to construct or rehabilitate units of low income housing. The states would have had to show that the costs of construction did not exceed the costs of the expenditure on hotels, and that, unless
demand for emergency housing increased, they would close down the hotels
upon the production of the permanent housing units. 9 7 The measure disappeared from P. L. No. 100-485, the final version of the Family Support Act. 98
The attempt to re-allocate emergency assistance payments to cover
housing costs did not die; it was transmogrified, and it is instructive to note
how. The 1988 re-authorization of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, the first of any appropriations bills targeted specifically at
meeting emergency needs of homeless people, contains a $20 million authorization for up to three demonstration projects. As did its predecessors,
this program also aims to reduce hotel placements. The difference is the
mechanism. Here, the grants are channeled into the construction of "transitional housing," not permanent housing. Also, while in the earlier versions of
the Family Support Act the units of permanent housing were to replace the
hotel placements, in this new version the states first build the transitional
housing, and then convert it to permanent housing once the transitional housing is no longer needed. 99 An unavoidable question is, given that the residents will have nowhere else to go, how the transitional housing will become
superfluous. The McKinney Act version represents a retreat from the imaginative attempt to make AFDC into a housing program, and does so in two
ways. First, it substantively rejects the goal of creating permanent housing as
an antidote for homelessness. Second, the very inclusion of this measure in
an emergency shelter statute- not an AFDC statute or a housing statutesuggests avoidance: avoidance of conceptualizing housing as an entitlement,
as it would arguably be as an AFDC benefit; and avoidance of recognizing
scarcity of housing as a permanent problem.
The endurance of the concept that localities cannot allocate EANFC
funds to reni supplements or to the construction of permanent housing is a
tribute to the pervasive power of myth. Everyone believes, not merely that the
97. § 1511, the Family Security Act of 1988; Title V, Demonstration Projects;
§ 501, Demonstration Program of Grants to Provide Permanent Housing for Families
that would Otherwise Require Emergency Assistance, 134 CONG. REC. 7631, 7643
(daily ed. June 13, 1988); H.R. 1720, The Family Welfare Reform Act of 1987, § 805,
Demonstration Program of Grants to Provide Permanent Housing for Families that
would Otherwise Require Emergency Assistance.
98. The conference committee report simply noted under Title V. A., Grants to Provide Permanent Housing for Families, that §§ 501 and 805 of the Senate and House
bills did not appear in the conference agreement. Conference report, to accompany
HR 1720, H.R. 100-998, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (Sept. 29, 1988). A similar, subsequent attempt to subsidize the construction of permanent low income housing
through the AFDC program was introduced, but did not progress, in 1989. H.R. 363,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
99. Act of Nov. 7, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-628, § 903, 102 Stat. 3224, 3258.
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Social Security Act does not sanction the direction of public benefits towards
building or subsidizing affordable housing, but that it actively prohibits it.
Summarizing his proposal to amend the AFDC statute to allow the application
of EANFC funds to the construction of permanent housing, Representative
Charles Schumer enunciated the conventional wisdom:
Why don't cities like New York use the millions of dollars they are
now spending on temporary welfare hotels to build instead permanent homes for the homeless?
The answer is simple. Current federal law makes such a wise policy
illegal. Cities like New York would love to leave the scandal of welfare hotels behind them, but federal law gives them no choice.10 0
The truth about whether welfare dollars can go to housing programs is
much murkier than "conventional wisdom" suggests. Nothing in the AFDC
statute or regulations plainly authorizes the spending of public benefits funds
on housing assistance, but nothing expressly forbids it either. While basic
principles of appropriations, as enunciated in the United States Code, allow
congressionally mandated funds to be "applied only to the objects for which
the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law," 10 1 it
seems clear that the current diversion of AFDC and EANFC funds into exorbitant hotel placements was no more contemplated by the original goals of the
Social Security Act than would be the expenditure of those funds for housing.
Arguably, to provide an indigent family with either a dignified home, or
the means to rent space in one, serves the original purpose of the Social
Security Act admirably. As the legislative history indicates, and historians
have noted, Title IV-A of the Act was to assume some of the burden of the
states' mothers' pension programs. These were designed specifically to
save impoverished widows from the agonizing expedient of institutionalizing
their children for want of resources to care for them at home. 10 2 The more
100. Use of Emergency Asssistance Funds for Acquisition of Temporary and Permanent Housing for Homeless Families, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Public
Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1986) (written submission of Charles E. Schumer,
congressman from New York) (emphasis in original). See also Schmitt, supra note
96, at B6, col. 1 ("Federal regulations prohibit spending the money, which comes
from the Department of Health and Human Services, on housing").
101. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1985).
102. The House report on the Social Security Bill of 1935 noted that forty-five states
had enacted mothers' pension laws for families left fatherless through death or abandonment, but that these programs could not address the depth of the need. The report stated specifically that one result of the mothers' pension program was "to keep
the young children with their mother in their own home, thus preventing the necessity
of placing the children in institutions." H.R. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1935). For an analysis of the spread of mothers' pension legislation as a development in the intellectual history of public welfare, see Left, Consensus for Reform: The
Mothers Pension Movement in the Progressive Era, 47 Soc. SERV. R. 397 (1973).
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recent EANFC legislation also explicitly denotes as a goal the care at home of
the indigent child.10 3 Accommodations of a transient type are not homes; to
subsidize continued occupancy of them is a travesty of legislative intent,
while to build decent permanent housing for families would be an affirmation
of it.
If the purpose seems clear, and the impediments cloudy, why then the
reluctance to use either AFDC special needs or EANFC money as rent, or as
seed money for renovation or construction? The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court has raised one reason, which explains the thrust of welfare
policy elsewhere: using welfare money to subsidize housing for those families that currently occupy temporary shelter might seem like an unfair supplemental subsidy, insofar as the subsidy is not available to families that already
live in conventional housing and pay for rents out of their regular AFDC
grants. 10 4 I will discuss in more detail how this generalized concern about
equalizing benefits among welfare recipients has informed other areas of policy in which welfare and housing issues intersect. But another, broader reason suggests itself: that is, as one student commentator has astutely noted,
that while "home" is central to the American dream of self-sufficiency, it remains alien 5to the historical American concept of what a family on welfare
0
deserves. 1

IV.

THE QUALITY OF LIFE, OR OTHER OXYMORONS, IN THE
CULTURE OF SHELTER

Our notions of "home" are complicated. They involve more than the
concreteness of physical structures; they entail inchoate feelings about stability, privacy and familiarity that have historically both informed the physical
structures of "home," and been informed by them.' 0 6 The models of mass
shelter deny all these feelings. At two of the "Tier I" barracks shelters in New
103. For a description of the development of the EANFC legislation in 1967, see
infra notes 132-145 and accompanying text.
104. Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Secretary of Human Services,
400 Mass. 806, 511 N.E.2d 603, 613 n.16. (1987). For a discussion of the philosophy
of equalizing welfare benefits through recoupment of advances and through limiting
emergency housing payments to the level of the welfare shelter allowance, see infra
notes 189-206 and accompanying text.
105. Paterson, Recent Developments: Between Helping the Child and Punishing the
Mother: Homelessness Among AFDC Families, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 236, 256
(1989).
106. In his evocative and accessible treatise about the evolution of the concept of
"home," Witold Rybczynski explains "comfort" as a historical accretion of ideas
about privacy, intimacy, domesticity, and ease. W. RYBCZYNSKI, HOME: A SHORT HIsTORY OF AN IDEA 230-231 (1986). The excerpt from Frost's Death of a Hired Man has
been over-quoted perhaps because it rings so true:
'Home is the place where, when you have to go there,
They have to take you in.'
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York City, as described in Slade v. Koch, 1 0 7 men, women and children slept
in rows in open rooms, and used the same toilet facilities. Contagious diseases and diarrhea were rampant. 10 8 Hazards consisting in part of peeling
lead paint, and asbestos in another Tier I shelter, the Catherine Street shelter, prompted litigation not only to eliminate the conditions, but to prohibit
placement in the shelter of pregnant women or children under the age of
seven. 10 9 Hotel shelter may offer more privacy, but no less privation. Residents may still sleep three or four to a room. Without access to kitchens,
residents use hot plates, or receive an allowance for prepared food; without
recreation areas, children play in the hallways.1 10 Shelter-living of any kind
interrupts the rhythms of family life: meal times, study times, play times.
What receives the most attention is, first, the squalor, and second, the
expense. What is less immediately obvious, perhaps precisely because it is
so overwhelming, is the disorientation. The lock-outs complained of in Walls
v.Barry deprived the residents of more than simple shelter: they forced on
them a nomadic schedule, one of wandering from 7:30 a.m. when they were
ejected from the shelters, to 7:00 p.m., when they were let back in. 11 1 The
plight of homeless families in Westchester County arises as much from the
great distance from their original neighborhoods at which they are housed, as
from the actual fact of their homelessness. The county houses some families
in motels two hours away, in an area devoid of public
transportation. Mothers
1 12
have no access to jobs, other family or friends.
For families in need, for whom the tie to welfare benefits or social services is crucial, the difficulties of maintaining contact with the social services
system are significant. "Churning"- the rapid administrative closing and reopening of welfare cases- is a process that seems particularly to afflict
homeless families. In congressional testimony, Steven Banks noted that half

'I should have called it
Something you somehow haven't to deserve.'
R. FROST, The Death of the Hired Man in SELECTED POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 25, 29
(1962 ed.).
107. Slade v. Koch, 135 Misc. 2d 283, 514 N.Y.S.2d 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987),
modified to extend prior order to state defendants, 136 Misc. 2d 119, 517 N.Y.S.2d
389 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
108. Id. at 514 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849. One of the two Tier I shelters described in
Slade, the Roberto Clemente shelter, has been closed since July of 1986. HUMAN
RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, supra note 3, at 6.
109. Barnes v. Koch, 136 Misc. 2d 119, 518 N.Y.S.2d 539 at 539-40, 543 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987).
110. Schmitt, Westchester Homeless Linger in a Connecticut Hotel, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 13, 1989, at B1, col. 1, at B8, col. 5-6.
111. See Walls v. Barry, supra note 4.
112. Foderaro, Westchester's Farthest-Flung Homeless, NY. Times, July 11, 1989,
at B1, col 2. As of November, 1989, Westchester County's Department of Social
Services was housing thirty-nine families in the Coachman Hotel in Stamford, Connecticut, at a rate of $75 per room per night. Schmitt, supra note 110.
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of the homeless families entering New York City's Emergency Assistance
Units (EAUs) for placement in temporary shelter had had their welfare cases
administratively closed.1 1 3 A study produced by the Manhattan Borough
President's task force revealed that homeless families in that city's shelters
were twice as likely to have their public assistance cases administratively
closed as were housed families. The reason posited for the termination of
benefits was the inability of the homeless families to document financial and
other conditions of eligibility.' 1 4
Perhaps the most troubling effects of the dislocation from familiar surroundings are felt by children. Ellen Bassuk has described the psychological
problems manifested by children she has interviewed in Massachusetts shelters: for some, their depression, sleep disorders, and anxiety were sufficiently
severe to warrant further psychiatric attention. 115 Homelessness also compromises children's physical health. Access to continuous health care, with
the same pediatrician, is a luxury that children lose once they are moved from
their communities into shelter. In the absence of on-site units, children may
find their only way to health care through the hospital emergency room.' 1 6
The logistical difficulties in organizing routine pediatric check-ups for children
in shelters allow asthma and acute ear infections to go untreated. In almost
half of the seven thousand on-site visits made by a mobile pediatric unit to
children in New York City shelters, the health care workers found that the
children were not immunized against polio, diphtheria, or tetanus.1 17 Other
investigators in New York shelters
have documented numerous cases of un1 18
controlled diarrhea in children.
One extremely concrete result of placelessness is the deprivation of edu113. Use of AFDC Funds for Homeless Families, supra note 25, at 137 (statement of
Steven Banks, attorney, Homeless Family Rights Project, Legal Aid Society of New
York). For an abstract of results of a continuing study on the effects of welfare case
"churning," see Dehavenon, Administrative Closings of Public Assistance Cases: The
Rise of Hunger and Homelessness in New York City, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 741 (1987-8).

114. J.R. Dumpson, supra note 46 at, 78-79. Concern over the problems experienced by homeless families in receiving benefits by mail and verifying their eligibility,
led to passage of Title XI of P.L. No. 99-570, the Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act,
100 Stat. 5220. The Act amended the Food Stamp Act of 1977 (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 2012(g)) to allow for use of food stamps in shelters and to guarantee receipt of food
stamps by individuals lacking fixed residential addresses, 100 Stat. 5220, 5221, and
required the Secretary of HHS to issue guidelines to the states for providing AFDC
benefits to homeless children, 100 Stat. at 5222.
115. Bassuk and Rubin, supra note 48, at 281-2.
116. Homelessness During Winter 1988-1989: Prospects for Change, supra note 3,
at 18 (oral statement of Dr. Irwin E. Redlener, Director of New York Children's Health
Project).
117. Id. at 62-3 (written statement of Dr. Irwin E. Redlener).
118. J. Molnar, supra note 41, at 36. See also COMMITTEE ON HEALTH CARE FOR
HOMELESS PEOPLE, supra note 23, at 66.
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cational opportunity. Some homeless children commute daunting distances
to school; for children sheltered outside their home county of Westchester,
the round trip is 180 miles to attend their former schools in Yonkers.1 19 This
is the price that homeless children may pay in order to maintain their connections to the classroom teachers who know them best. In fact, the Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 protects this connection by
guaranteeing homeless children the choice of attending either the school
within the district of their shelter, or their former school. 120 Aggressive intervention to ensure the kind of extraordinary transportation and coordination
necessary to accomplish this goal may not always take place. Children do
get lost in the educational system. A recent study by the Maryland State Department of Education reported that, of the 3,795 school-aged children estimated to be homeless during school year 1988-9, 32.7% did not attend
school or attended irregularly. 1 2 1 A study of children sheltered in New York
City found that, by Labor Day, 1987, 583 out of 6,000 school age children
were registered 3for school; 12 2 by Thanksgiving, half of the children were in
12
fact attending.
I have described cursorily situations in which the loss of a permanent
home has disrupted patterns of access to education, income and health care.
In creating these dislocations, homelessness imposes temporary, shifting
time frames. The irony is that the sense of temporariness extends over what
has become a temporally permanent situation. In reviewing any of the scattered data on occupancy of mass shelter, or hotel shelter, one learns quickly
that "temporary shelter" is a misnomer. Data kept by the Human Resources
Administration of New York City indicate that, as of May, 1989, the average
length of stay of a family in city-operated shelter was 278 days. Of the 4152
families then in shelter, 1,728 had lived there for from six months to one year;
1,106 had lived in shelter for from one to seven years. 124 Families housed in
two motels in Westchester County have joined in lawsuits to compel housing
code enforcement against the motel owners, based in part on the theory that
the hotel rooms are in fact functioning as permanent housing. 1 2 5 Families
119. Foderaro, supra note 112, at B1, col. 2.
120. The Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 10077, § 722(e)(3) requires each state plan to contain a provision directing local school
districts to enroll the child in either school district, depending on the child's best
interest.
121.

MD. STATE DEPT. OF EDUCATION,

DREN IN MARYLAND

A

TRACKING SYSTEM FOR HOMELESS CHIL-

2 (1988-9).

122. J. Molnar, supra note 41, at 8.
123. Id. at x-xii.
124.

HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

supra note 3

at 7-8 (1989).
125. Henry, Homeless Families in "Welfare Motels" Want Them Closed, 10 YOUTH
L. NEWS 12 (July-Aug. 1989). The procedural cast of these cases is somewhat complicated. In both, the homeless residents of the hotels, one in White Plains in Westchester County, one in Putnam County, complained to city officials about hazardous
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as four individuals to a single
had lived in the Fox Ridge Motor Inn, as many
12 6
room, for from five months to four years.

V.

A CONCLUSION-

THE IMPORTANCE OF RECOGNIZING THE
FICTIONS SUPPORTING TEMPORARY PERMANENT SHELTER

The instinct to create a "home" out of materials inimical to any idea of
home is powerful. The tenants- for they were tenants, not occupants- of
the Fox Ridge Motor Inn hung honor roll awards and family photographs on
the walls of their one-room dwellings, and taped pictures of Alf on the bathroom doors. 12 7 In finding that the Fox Ridge Inn was operating as a "domicile" for its homeless tenants, not as a "TR" (temporary residence),' 28 a
hearing officer noted that these conditions of tenancy were as dispositive as
were the lengths of the tenants' stays. What distinguished "domicile" from
"hotel room" for him was evidence that the tenants had tried to recreate not
only all the patterns of home- cooking, eating, receiving mail, sleeping,
reading- but also the associations of home- the photographs and posliving conditions. Prior case law required the plaintiff counties in the ensuing enforcement actions to serve the residents and the Westchester County Departmernt of Social
Services, which had placed the homeless families in this housing, as co-defendants.
See Town of Brookhaven v. Marion Chun Enterprises, 71 N.Y.2d 953, 528 N.Y.S.2d
822 (1988). In City of White Plains v. Universal Motor Lodges, Index No. 9713/88
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Oct. 4, 1988), the county sought an injunction directly in New York
State Supreme Court to compel compliance with housing and fire code standards.
The residents submitted no answer to the City's complaint, and joined in the City's
motion to close the hotel for housing code violations. Id., Memorandum of Law for
Coachman Tenants at ii-iii. After receiving similar complaints from the residents of the
Fox Ridge Motor Inn in Putnam County, the Putnam County Board of Health ruled
administratively that the motel was violating conditions of its temporary residence permit. Hearing Officer's Report: In the Matter of the Complaint against John Gillen, Department of Social Services, John and Jane Doe, (tenants of the Inn) and the Fox
(Division of Environmental Health Services, County of Putnam, State of New York,
Dec. 5, 1988). The order terminating the motel's permit, and, consequently, forcing
the relocation of the tenants, was stayed until April 5, 1989, when the New York State
Supreme Court ordered it enforced. John Gillen and Nimby Food Services, Inc., v.
Putnam County Department of Health, and John and Jane Doe v. The Board of Health
of the County of Putnam, Index No. 3737/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 5, 1989). With the
Fox Ridge closed, the tenants have dispersed to other hotels; the owner's appeal is
pending. Telephone conversation with Jerrold Levy, Westchester Legal Services,
Inc., attorney for Fox Ridge Tenants' Association, Feb . 8, 1990.
126. In the Matter of the Complaint against John Gillen, supra note 125, Proposed
Findings of Facts, Proposed Conclusions of Law and Proposed Recommendations, at
7-8.
127. Id. Respondents Fox Ridge Tenants Association's Proposed Findings of
Facts, Proposed Conclusions of Law and Proposed Recommendations at 8 (Nov. 4,
1988).
128. Id., at 11.
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ters. 129 As Ihave noted, the disorientation created by relocation in emergency shelter disrupts such patterns and associations. The experience of the
Fox Ridge and Coachman tenants suggests that families must make homes.
But years of housing families in transient accommodations for months and
years has created a truly oxymoronic category of shelter: that of permanent
temporary housing. The fiction of temporariness that supports this category
makes it impossible for families to create true homes, behavioral structures of
living over which they have control, within the physical structure over which
they also have control. The reality of permanence has created the kinds of
physiological, economic, and psychological harm to children and their
mothers that I have described.
In her dissent in the mid-level appellate opinion of Franklin v. New Jersey
Department of Human Services, a case challenging the state's five month
limit on emergency shelter assistance, Judge Pressler noted a truth about
welfare motels as emergency shelter: "The equation of emergency assistance with that form of shelter is historical and empirical - not conceptual." 130 If one reads "conceptual" as meaning "necessary" or "natural,"
one can only agree. There is nothing conceptually inevitable about associating a hotel room with shelter, let alone with a home. What is innovative about
the Westchester County actions, setting them apart from other important suits
brought to improve conditions of shelter, 1 3 1 is that they call a duck a duck. If
129. Id., at 9-10.
130. Franklin, v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, and McCurdy v. New
Jersey Department of Human Services, 225 N.J. Super. 504, 543 A.2d 56, 78 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (Pressler, P.J.A.D., dissenting); aff'd, 111 N.J. 1,543 A.2d
1 (1988).
131. Chief among these, and illustrative of the treatment of emergency shelter as
temporary housing, governed by standards unique to temporary housing, is McCain v.
Koch, 127 Misc.2d 23,484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1984), rev'd, 117 A.D.2d 198,
502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987); original order reinstated, 136 A.D.2d 473, 523 N.Y.S.2d 112
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988). The four reported cases in the McCain series only reflect part
of the decisional history in the case; a summary of some of the interim orders is contained in the first Appellate Division decision at 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720,
725-7. Implicitly regarding shelter as an entitlement enforceable by expectation,
rather than one created explicitly by statute or the state constitution, the trial court then
affirmed its interim creation of standards of occupancy. McCain, supra, at 484
N.Y.S.2d 985, 987. These standards, as reiterated by the Court of Appeals, drew in
part from residential housing codes, and in part from consideration of survival needs,
such as bedding. McCain, supra, at 517 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920. The Appellate Division
reversed this order as an inappropriate intrusion into administrative agency practice.
502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 732. But in reversing another trial court's denial of preliminary
relief for a group of intervenors, the Appellate Division in the same decision found an
obligation initially to provide shelter, based on state law under the state's AFDC plan.
Id. at 728. When the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's initial setting of
standards for shelter quality was a valid equitable exercise in the absence of any
administrative standards (standards were subsequently formulated), the issue be-
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hotel shelter is used as housing, wholly unsuitable as it is for that purpose,
then it is housing. For the state to persist in regarding such dwellings as
temporary shelter is to engage in a temporizing expedient that denies the
reality of housing shortages and poverty. By invoking those standards of
safety and occupancy that are usually applied to permanent homes, the
Westchester enforcement actions severed the fictive connection between hotel rooms, conceptualized as transitory accommodation, and shelter.

VI.

THE DISHARMONIOUS CONVERGENCE OF HOUSING AND
WELFARE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AID TO FAMILIES
WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND THE EMERGENCY
ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES WITH
CHILDREN PROGRAMS

I mentioned earlier that welfare became a housing program by default;
unlike federal housing programs, AFDC is an entitlement program with no
budgetary ceiling. The result is the $37,000 per year welfare hotel room, the
conspicuous anomaly that outrages critics of the welfare hotel system. Another senseless feature of the shelter-as-welfare system is this: that a state
welfare department will authorize a local jurisdiction to pay between $60 and
$160 per family, per night to a private, commercial operator of a motel or
barracks-style dormitory, but will prohibit the subsidy of that family, at less
than half the cost, in an apartment. To understand both aberrations, one
must examine the intersecting histories of the two federal programs which
provide the primary source of shelter assistance to needy families- AFDC
and its offspring, Emergency Assistance to Needy Families with Children
(EANFC).
At one level, the explanation is simple. States can receive unlimited
matching federal reimbursements for the money they allocate to the EANFC
program. While the federal government may pay an even higher share of the
expenses of the on-going AFDC programs in the poorest states, the EANFC
132
match at least equals the lowest rate of federal reimbursement for AFDC.
Another intended attraction of the EANFC program is its flexibility. Criteria for
assistance are broad, and states interpret their discretion to set more particularized criteria broadly. The criteria have also been consistent over time. Uncame fixed as one concerning a court's ability to set and enforce shelter standards.
McCain, supra, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5) provides a federal contribution of 50% of the total spent
by a state for EANFC, the lowest of the federal financial participation formulae for a
Title IV-A program. For the regular AFDC program, federal payments vary from a high
of 100%- that is, complete federal coverage- of state expenses incurred in implementing the verification of immigrant status program (42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(3)(A)),
through a variable formula for contribution to the basic AFDC grants (42 U.S.C.
§ 603(a)(1)(A and B)), down to a 50% match for states' expenditures for the
mandatory work program (42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(3)(D)).
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like the core provisions of the AFDC program, which have changed at least
five times since the inception of the EANFC program in 1968, the EANFC
133
statute and its regulations have remained virtually untouched.
The federal EANFC program began with what is for its current homeless
beneficiaries a historical irony. The first recipients of emergency assistance
were to be migrant workers and their families 134 who were ineligible for the
regular AFDC program for at least two reasons: they could not meet the durational residency requirements which many states then imposed; 135 and the
presence of both parents, both working, in migrant workers' families contra36
vened the definition of "dependent child" central to the concept of AFDC. 1
133. For brief, functional description of the major changes in the AFDC program,
see STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST. CONG., 1ST. SESS., BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 517-533 (Comm. Print 1989). For a description of the

EANFC program, see Emergency Aid to Families Program: Hearing before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-29
(1986) (statement of Jo Anne B. Ross, Associate Commissioner for Family Assistance, Social Security Administration, Department of Health and Human Services).
134. See Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 142, n.10, (1982) for a brief description of
the history of the legislation creating the EAFC program, with particular reference to its
beginnings in H.R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. as a temporary program for migrant
workers' families.
135. In its report on H.R. 12080, the Social Security Amendments of 1967, the successor to the unsuccessful H.R. 5710, the Senate Committee on Finance noted of the
"Temporary emergency assistance" portion at § 206(b) of the bill that "The provision
is broad enough that emergencies can be met in migrant families as well as those
meeting residence requirements of the state's AFDC program." H.R.REP. No. 544,
90th Cong. 1st Sess. 109 (1967); S. Rep. No.744, 90th Cong. 1st. Sess., reprinted in
1967 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. NEWS 2834, 3003. Shortly after the passage of Pub. L.

No. 90-248, the Supreme Court invalidated such durational residency requirements
for AFDC applicants in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
136. The original definition of "dependent child" under Title IV, § 406(a) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as a child deprived of parental support due to the death,
incapacity or absence of one parent, has remained virtually unchanged up to the present. Compare H.R. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935) (definition of "dependent child" under § 406, H.R.7260) with 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1985, Supp. 1989).
In 1962, Congress added Section 407 to Title IV to allow states the option of assisting
the families of dependent children where both parents were present in the household
but one parent was unemployed. See Pub. L. No. 90-248 (the AFDC-U statute, 75
Stat. 75, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)). § 203(a) of Pub. L. 90-248 amended 42
U.S.C. § 607(a) to standardize states' definitions of "unemployment," and to re-define
"dependent child," under the unemployed parent option, as a child deprived of parental support as the result of the unemployment of a father. H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th
Cong. 1st Sess. 17, 107-8 (1967). Congress subsequently re-defined AFDC-U to limit
eligibility to dependent children in families with an unemployed "principal wage
earner." See Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2313. In the Family Support Act of 1988, Congress has for the first time required the states to include assistance to two-parent
families as part of their mandatory state plans. Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 401(a)(1),
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The original "Temporary Assistance for Migratory Workers" bill offered states
assistance in establishing demonstration projects through which workers and
their families could receive a maximum of sixty days of assistance, subject to
two major conditions: that the recipients could not be eligible for assistance
under the AFDC program, and that they could only receive as much assist137
ance as they would receive if they were eligible for the AFDC program.
The rationale behind the experiment seemed clear. Without increasing their
on-going AFDC caseloads or broadening the range of benefits to their own
indigent residents, states could help needy transient families quickly, and,
temporarily, before they moved on. The proposal treated the migrant poor
and the indigenous poor equally. Although these new recipients would receive relief without the burden of meeting the normal eligibility requirements,
they would enjoy no more generous benefits than their counterparts.
Many of the programs first advanced in the ill-fated H.R. 5710 reemerged in H.R. 12080, the Social Security Amendments of 1967, which with
few changes ultimately became P.L. No. 90-248.138 H.R. 12080 extended the
concept of an optional temporary emergency assistance program to all needy
families with children, with aid to migrant families incorporated as an option
within the option. 13 9 In a massive initiative focused on two often divergent
legislative concerns-the physical welfare of the dependent child, and the
employability of the dependent child's parent-the temporary emergency
140
The House Ways and
assistance provision addressed the first issue.

codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4 1); § 401(a)(2)(B), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607(b). For
a comprehensive discussion of the changes in the AFDC statute between 1961 and
1981, to allow assistance to two parent families, see S. Law, Women, Work, Welfare
and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1259 - 1261 and accompanying footnotes (1983).
137. H.R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess 122-133 (1967).
138. For a brief, useful discussion of the political history of the omnibus welfare
reform legislation encompassed in Pub. L. No. 90-248, see Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 409-411 (1970).
139. The House Report on the bill explained that its eligibility criteria were expansive enough to allow states to assist migrant workers' families, H.R. REP. No. 544,
90th Cong. 1st. Sess. 109, but the bill itself nowhere specifically guaranteed their
eligibility, H.R. REP. No. 544 at 181. The Senate's amendments made such eligibility
explicit. S. REP. No.744 reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2834, 3206.
140. Curiously, this and other expansions of the federal assistance program appeared in a bill ostensibly concerned with the failure of previous welfare reforms to
induce "independence and self-support," and to curb "rapidly increasing costs to the
taxpayers." See H.R.REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1967). The idea was to
pay now, to stop paying later. Most of the admittedly expensive new programs proposed in H.R. 12080 focused on work incentives, defined broadly. Viewed as measures to restore "employment and self-reliance" were such diverse provisions as those
allowing working AFDC recipients to retain some of their earnings, requiring them to
attend vocational school or "community work" programs, offering higher payments to
foster care parents, and requiring the states to institute family planning. Id., at 96-97.
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Means Committee Report ("House Report") on H.R. 12080 emphasized that
a child's well-being could depend on the ability of a social services' department to respond immediately to crisis: eviction, shut-off of utilities, accidental
death of 1 a parent, or "when an alcoholic parent leaves children without
14
food."
The House version took from H.R.5710 the idea that applicants for extraordinary relief need not meet the non-financial eligibility criteria of the longterm AFDC program. Whatever their status, applicants for extraordinary relief
would have to show the absence of other "available resources" to alleviate
the crisis. The House Report noted that, since the major financial eligibility
criterion for the program would be destitution, many applicants either could
meet the comparable financial criteria for AFDC, or in fact would be AFDC
applicants, forced into applying for emergency assistance because of the
sluggishness of the AFDC application process.' 4 2 The House limited the duration of relief available to thirty days within any twelve-month period. To
provide the states both flexibility and financial incentive, the bill gave wide
latitude in the type of assistance states could provide, and offered federal
14 3
financial participation of 50% for cash payments, and 75% for services.
In its version of the bill, the Senate re-emphasized the measure's pre-occupation with employability by forbidding federal funding to ameliorate emergencies arising from the needy child's or caretaker relative's refusal to accept
employment or employment training. 144
P.L. No. 90-248 retained the voluntary nature of the program, the discretion as to the type of emergency benefit offered, the House's funding formula,
the thirty day limit on relief, and the Senate's work-related prohibition. Codi141. H.R. REP. NO. 544, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE
2834, 3002.
142. As the House Committee on Ways and Means noted, "The committee understands that the process of determining AFDC eligibility and authorizing payments frequently precludes the meeting of emergency needs when a crisis occurs." H.R. REP.
No. 544, 90th Cong.lst Sess. 109, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2834, 3002. Regarding the issue of the relationship of eligibility for AFDC to eligibility
for the new emergency program, the Committee stated, "The families do not have to
be receiving or eligible upon application to receive AFDC (although they are generally
of the same type), but they must be without available resources and the payment or
service must be necessary in order to meet an immediate need that would not otherwise be met." Id., at 109, reprinted at 3003.
143. Id., at 109, reprinted at 3003. The Senate's version of the bill would have
retained the older, more generous sixty day maximum for emergency assistance. S.
REP. No. 744, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2834, 3003.
144. S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2834, 3127. The conference committee product retained the thirty day limitation on assistance, the migrant worker provision, and the prohibition on assistance
to families destitute as a result of a refusal to accept work or job training. 1967 U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWS

CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS

at 3206.
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fied at 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1), with the funding formula at § 603(a)(5), the
145
substance has remained substantially unchanged up through the present.
The final form of the legislation actually clarified the legislative goals, to the
of such child or to
extent that it allowed emergency aid "to avoid destitution
' 146
provide living arrangements in a home for such child."
If both the intent and the plain meaning of the EANFC statute seem to
expand and complement the goals of the AFDC program, there is one aspect
in which the emergency program is far more restrictive, and, to a degree,
punitive. The work requirement in EANFC, as enacted and as currently in
place, in some ways tracks the current AFDC provision. But the EANFC statute absolutely disqualifies an entire family from assistance if its "destitution or
need for living arrangements" results from the refusal of "such child or relative" to accept a job without good cause.14 7 "Relative" is defined by the
AFDC definition, as any one of a number of individuals sharing a home with
the "dependent child," and connected to her by biology or marriage. 148
Under the current AFDC work requirements, disqualification of the household.
from benefits will result only from the "principal wage-earner's" unjustifiable
rejection of employment; under the amended AFDC statute, only the wageearner and her spouse will lose eligibility. 149 Thus, the EANFC statute does
go beyond its parent legislation in penalizing a needy child for the conduct of
adults, adults who may be only tangentially related to her.

145. 42 USC § 603(a)(5) was amended in 1972, to reduce the 75% federal funding
figure for emergency services to 50%. State and Local Fiscal Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 946, 947. See also 34 Fed. Reg. 393 (Jan. 10, 1969), (codified
at 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(b)(2)), amended at 39 Fed. Reg. 5316 (Feb. 12, 1974) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(b)(2)).
146. Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 206(b).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) defines needy child as one living "with any of the relatives specified in subsection (a)(1)." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1) enumerates the qualifying
blood or married relatives.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F)(i)(1985) stated that any relative's refusal to accept a
suitable job or to register in a work incentive program would disqualify that relative
from being assisted as part of the AFDC family unit. If a parent designated as the
"principal earner" in the "Unemployed Parent" program, 42 U.S.C. § 607, refused
such participation, then that refusal disqualified the entire family. 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(19)(F)(ii) (1985). Effective October 1, 1990, the Family Support Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-485, continues the same disqualification for the uncooperative family
member. 102 Stat. 2343, 2359 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(G)(i)()). In a
two-parent family, only the unemployed wagearner and her/his non-working spouse
will be disqualified from assistance for refusal to participate in "JOBS," the new vocational training and education program. 102 Stat. 2343, 2359 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(G)(i)(ll)). Under the Family Support Act, the "unemployed parent
program," at 42 U.S.C. § 607, which gave states the option to assist two parent families with AFDC, becomes mandatory for all the states. 102 Stat. 2343, 2393 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(41)).
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But if the final provisions of the EANFC legislation in some ways sharpened the program's substantive goals, they confused the future of the program's implementation by muddling its relationship with AFDC. Recall that
the germ of the EANFC concept, in the migrant worker proposal, made the
demarcations clear: recipients were those ineligible under the non-financial
criteria of AFDC, and they were to receive no more than the equivalent of
AFDC benefits. The legislative .history of the successor program greatly expanded the federal government's role, but did so with equal clarity. Emergency assistance would be available to meet the catastrophic needs of any
destitute child, regardless of whether that child's family already received government benefits. But this is the point at which the historical and the statutory
clarity ends. Congress leaves two administrative issues uncontemplated.
First, in giving the states carte blanche in choosing the amount and kind of
emergency benefits, the legislative deliberations and statute never explicitly
addressed the issue of whether such benefits should meet, exceed, or in any
way be measured against the benefits that families receive continuously
under the AFDC program. Second, neither the legislative history nor the statute make crystalline under what structure states should administer their
EANFC programs.
One could justifiably say that, given the sweep of the legislation, such
concerns deserve to be dismissed as quibbles. With regard to comparability
of benefits between the two programs, Congress seemed unconcerned. The
issue was not how minutely to calibrate the degree of assistance; the goal
was to meet the economic needs of children in crisis, with whatever resources were necessary to the task. A structure for the program's administration already existed. The committee deliberations included emergency
assistance as one stick in a bundle of welfare reforms, some binding upon
the states and some optional. The historical implication was that all of these
improvements, once adopted by the states, were to be included in the states'
AFDC plans, and thus all were to be subject to federal review. 150 Section
206(b) of P.L. No. 90-248, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1), implies strongly
that, if a state wishes to participate in the EANFC program, the state must
include its EANFC plan in the overall AFDC plan it submits to the Secretary of
15 1
Health and Human Services.
But such quibbles have dictated the course of all future litigation about
EANFC, up to, through, and past Supreme Court pronouncements on the issues. Until recently, as noted earlier in this article, this was a modest program, provided by few states-within ten years of the date of enactment, only
twelve states, plus the District of Columbia, participated; at present, 30 juris-

150. H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97 (1967).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1989) imposes upon the states the basic structure and
substantive minima of the federal AFDC program. Federal financial participation
under 42 U.S.C. § 603 is conditioned upon the Secretary of Health and Human Services' approval of the state plan, under 42 U.S.C. § 602(b)(1989).
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dictions offer the program. 152 Yet the smallness of the stakes has belied the
energy which some legislatures and local welfare departments have put into
circumscribing every aspect of the program. A review of the history of general litigation under the EANFC statute will show the domination of two issues:
whether the broad outlines of the federal statute circumscribe the circumstances under which the states must provide emergency relief, and the identity of the recipients to whom the states must provide it; and how the states
must balance their emergency and non-emergency welfare programs. It is
through a small body of state and federal case decisions, plus the Supreme
Court's two decisions interpreting the EANFC program that these issues have
been aired, if not clarified. 153 The problems arising from these issues have
not changed over time. What has changed has been the nature of the "emergency" service sought: the provision of long-term shelter.
In his study of the local administration of welfare programs, Joel Handler
noted a possible conflict between two goals of welfare reform. One goal consists of the promotion of "equity": whether relief programs distribute equal
resources, equally among all applicants entitled to them. A second goal emphasizes compassion to individuals: whether a bureaucracy can bend to
meet special needs. Accomplishment of the first objective was the strategy of
welfare reform efforts of the late 1960's; in part, the passage of the federal
emergency assistance program in 1968 constituted a corrective to the resulting standardization and bureaucratization of public benefits. 154 The law of
emergency relief has raised a third issue, one related to the perception of the
incompatibility between standardization and attention to unique circum-

152. Department of Health and Human Services, Family Support Administration, Office of Family Assistance; ASAP: Automated State AFDC Plans: Reports based on
State Plan Amendments Effective on or before January 1, 1989 and received by April
1, 1989; Report No. 21, "Emergency Assistance." Report No. 21 also indicates that
twenty-four of the thirty EANFC jurisdictions have opened their emergency programs
to migrant workers' families. It should be noted that this report gives July 1, 1976 as
the earliest date of entry of various jurisdictions into the EANFC program, that being
the date on which the Office of Family Assistance generated the first "ASAPs," computer-generated profiles of the states' Title IV-A plans. As the litigation concerning
EANFC reveals, several states enlisted in the EANFC program shortly after the effective date of the legislation, on Jan. 2, 1968.
153. As I will describe in greater detail further on, these Supreme Court decisions
are Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725 (1978) and Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982).
154. HANDLER, LAST RESORTS - EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND SPECIAL NEEDS
PROGRAMS IN PUBLIC WELFARE, 4-12 (1983) [hereinafter "LAST RESORTS"].

In one

among many surveys described in LAST RESORTS, Handler compared how state and
county welfare officials ranked the importance of 17 welfare system goals, both as
actual goals of the programs they administered, and as desirable goals. 'Make sure
clients are treated equally' ranked high among both actual and hortatory goals. with
"Be sensitive to unique financial circumstances" listed as a lower priority. Id. at 4951.
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stances: whether the formalistic equity sought in the regular welfare system
is possible or desirable in a system designed to respond to crisis.
This third issue has been approached through litigation over whether the
rules that promote equity in the AFDC structure apply to EANFC. The bulk of
litigation over the Social Security Act (SSA) in the late 1960's and early
1970's involved attempts to define the bounds of the states' discretion to run
their AFDC programs, primarily as to two points: who was eligible, and for
what benefits. The principles easily infered from the litigation were that the
states enjoyed enormous discretion in setting the dollars and cents of benefit
levels, 15 5 but virtually no discretion to depart from the terms of the SSA in
defining eligibility. 15 6 The Court's decisions reinforced the supremacy of
certain content-bound federal welfare statutes, as well as a principle of horizontal equity: that, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10), the states were to
furnish AFDC equally to "all eligible individuals," and that, in the absence of a
federal exclusion of any one group from eligibility, any state standard15which
7
narrowed eligibility for AFDC below the federal standard was invalid.
155. Although states must disclose their "standard of need," 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(23) (1985), they may fund their benefits at any level. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 482-3 (1970) (validating Maryland's structure of maximum AFDC
grants); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972) (allowing Texas' system of
"ratable reductions" which permitted lower grants for AFDC recipients than for recipients of old age assistance).
156. The two major areas of state-federal conflict over terms of eligibility involved
state definitions under 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) of "dependent child," and of what contributions to the household of the dependent child could be deemed to be "income"
countable against the household's financial eligibility. Under the first category, see
Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 578 (1975) (the Court upheld as consistent with the
SSA an Iowa statute which excluded fetuses from the definition of "dependent child"
and therefore from AFDC coverage ); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 602 (1972)
(California exclusion of military personnel from the category of "absent parent," and
thus of the children of military personnel from the category of "dependent child," violated the SSA); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285 (1971) (Illinois statute which
continued AFDC grants to high school or vocational school students, ages 18 to 20,
but not to college students of the same ages, violated the SSA definition of "dependent child" as anyone under age 21 attending any kind of school). Under the second
category, see Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338, 346-347 (1975) (New York state
regulations which reduced the shelter portion of a family's AFDC grant, based on the
presumption that non-rent-paying lodgers were contributing to the household, conflicted with federal statutory and regulatory prohibitions against deeming anything
other than actual, countable income to the household): and Shea v. Vialpando, 416
U.S. 251, 253 (1974) (Colorado's substitution of a standardized schedule for deductible work expenses violated the SSA's requirement that, in proving financial eligibility
for AFDC, AFDC recipients be allowed to deduct the actual amount of their work expenses from income).
157. Townsend v. Swank. 404 U.S. 282. 286 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
333 (1968), (relying on the statute, then codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9)). Constant
from 1971 through to the present, an "equal treatment' regulation has amplified the
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Before the Supreme Court's ruling in Quern v. Mandley, advocates had
invoked both of the AFDC principles (that the SSA controls the content of
state welfare plans, and that, consequently, the federal "all eligible individuals" statute compels states to extend all of the benefits to all the intended
beneficiaries) in their efforts to advocate for the broadest possible distribution
of EANFC benefits. Vignettes emerging from the scattered litigation attest to
the divergence among states' plans for emergency relief. Already enduring
the cold frigid house after their gas was shut off, an unemployed couple and
their children faced eviction over unpaid rent; they could receive nothing
under the Wisconsin EANFC statute because their emergency did not result
from fire or flood. 158 New Jersey's department of social services interpreted
its administrative code to require homelessness as a precondition to the
award of emergency relief, and denied aid to a family that lost its money to
buy food. 1 59 In these and other cases,16s plaintiffs often succeeded in arguing that the federal law prohibited the states from so drastically constricting
the concept of "emergency."
Published case decisions are of course poor documentation for a history
of social welfare policy. But HEW's summary from 1976 of state AFDC plans

statutory principle that all AFDC recipients eligible under federal criteria must receive
their statutorily mandated benefits:
45 CF.R. § 233.10 (1988)
(a) State plan requirements. A State plan under title... IV-A of the Social
Security Act must:
(1) Specify the groups of individuals.., and all the conditions of eligibility ....
The groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the eligibility
conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment
of individuals or groups in the light of the provisions and purposes of the
public assistance titles of the Social Security Act....
The original "equal treatment" rule, first implemented at 36 Fed. Reg. 3866 (Feb. 27,
1971), contained virtually identical language, paragraphed differently.
158. See Kozinski v. Schmidt, 436 F.Supp. 201, 202 (E.D. Wisc. 1977). Citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.471 at 487 (1970), the court ruled that the state had properly exercised its legitimate objective to distribute scarce welfare resources, and
dismissed plaintiffs' claims that the statute had impermissibly narrowed the relief mandated by the federal EANFC statute. Kozinski, 436 F.Supp. at 205. See also Williams
v. Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163, 168-9 (3d Cir. 1976) in which the court struck similar
limitations in Pennsylvania's emergency assistance statutes (need only assisted if
caused by natural disaster or civil disorder) as abusing the limited discretion left to the
states under 42 U.S.C. § 606(e).
159. Burton v. New Jersey Department of Institutions and Agencies, Division of Public Welfare, 147 N.J. Super. 124, 370 A.2d 878, 880 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
160. For a comprehensive review of early litigation contesting the failure of state
statutory or regulatory measures to provide the full range of benefits contemplated by
the federal statute, see Note, Meeting Short-Term Needs of Poor Families: Emergency Assistance for Needy Families with Children, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 885-892
and footnotes (1975).
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supports the impression of a wide range of emergency assistance policies,
16 1
some seemingly bound only by the imagination of the policy planners.
What some-not all-shared were definitions of what circumstances were
suitable for emergency assistance, definitions that bore little relationship to
the plain language or goals of the federal statute. Even less obvious was how
assisting a family made homeless by the devastations of fire or flood, but not
one made homeless through eviction, would serve the purpose of rescuing all
children from desperate need.
What the Quem case added to this pattern of inconsistency was to endorse it. The case began as a challenge to two classifications which Illinois
created in its federally funded emergency assistance program: of recipients
(only AFDC families were eligible) 16 2 and of emergency (the only ameliorable
emergency was homelessness resulting from destruction of the dwelling, and
not from eviction due to nonpayment of rent). 1 63 It ended in a muddle. After
the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Illinois scheme violated 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)
by differentiating among needy children, the state used the ultimate weapon
in any welfare program: it pulled out of the EANFC program altogether. Illinois incorporated the former emergency program into its AFDC structure as
a "special needs" program. Plaintiffs cried subterfuge: the state was simply
trying to avoid extending emergency assistance to families not already on
welfare. According to plaintiffs, Illinois' ill-concealed goal was to evade both
the mandate of the EANFC statute and the well-established Social Security
principle of equal provision of benefits to eligible applicants. 164

161. See U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare; Social Security Administration, Assistance Payments Administration; Characteristics of State Plans for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children under the Social Security Act, Title IV-A (Oct.
1976) (hereinafter "Characteristics, 1976"). Of the twenty-six jurisdictions reporting
an EANFC program in place as of October, 1976, four-Kentucky, Characteristics at
76; Montana, Characteristics at 114; New Jersey, Characteristics at 129; and Utah,
Characteristics at 193-4 - limited their definitions of "emergency" to situations arising from circumstances that were "unforeseeable" or beyond the applicants' control
or ability to plan. Three jurisdictions - Pennsylvania, Characteristics at 166; South
Dakota, Characteristics at 182; and Virginia, Characteristics at 205 - confined
"emergency" to natural disaster, but see discussion of Pennsylvania's statute in Williams v. Wohlgemuth, supra, at n. 158. In a unique provision, Oregon allocated
EANFC funds for transportation, for the return of non-resident families to their state of
former residence. Characteristics at 162.
162. As did Illinois, Connecticut, Delaware and New Jersey restricted emergency
assistance to applicants already receiving public assistance, Characteristics at 28, 32,
129. See also Baxter v. Minter, 378 F.Supp. 1213, 1219-20 (D.Mass. 1974), in which
the court ruled that Massachusetts' limitation of federally funded emergency assistance benefits to recipients of or applicants eligible for public assistance was permissible, based on the wide latitude which Congress and the Supreme Court had given to
states to set levels of relief under the AFDC program.
163. Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 729 (1978).
164. Quern, 436 U.S. at 730-1.
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The Court ruled, first, that such a subsumption of one program's elements under another program's structure was permissible. 16 5 This part of
the decision underscored the principle that a state's participation in EANFC,
as in any public benefits program, is wholly voluntary. Second, the Court
decided that even under the prior structure, nothing in the federal law of public benefits required Illinois to extend every possible emergency benefit
equally to every potentially eligible applicant. Citing sparingly from legislative
history, the Court concluded that Congress had conceived of the federal
emergency assistance program as an entity totally separate in structure and
goals from AFDC. As a result, none of the principles controlling in AFDC,
particularly the "equal treatment" provision of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10), ap166
plied to EANFC.
But Illinois' conversion of its emergency program into an adjunct of the
AFDC program set two significant precedents for how states could address
extraordinary needs. Most obviously, by providing suchassistance only
through the AFDC program, a state by definition could exclude an entire class
of recipients clearly intended to benefit from the EANFC program. The main
benefit of such exclusion to the state is financial. If, for instance, a state confined emergency rent payments to participants in the AFDC program, it could
designate such assistance as a supplemental special needs grant, 167 or as
an advance on prospective AFDC payments. Under either designation, the
state could (and arguably would be required by federal regulation to do so)
treat such additional payments as "overpayments," and deduct them from
future AFDC grants. Such "recoupment" is clearly not possible from a
grantee who is not, and does not plan to be, a recipient of AFDC. 16 8 As I will
165. Quern, 436 U.S. at 737. The history of the litigation after the Seventh Circuit
invalidated Illinois' EANFC program is described at 436 U.S. 730-734. After the Seventh Circuit had remanded the case to the district court, both state and federal defendants moved to dismiss, based on Illinois' planned withdrawal from the EANFC
program. The district court dismissed. The circuit court reversed, finding that the
change in designation of the emergency assistance program to an AFDC special
needs program did not excuse the state's obligation to comply with the broad dictates
of the federal EANFC statute.
166. Quern, 436 U.S. at 744.
167. See HANDLER, supra, n. 37, at 23-4, for a discussion of the development of the
'special needs" mechanism.
168. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(13)(i) (1988) defines "overpayment" as an amount
given to an AFDC family which exceeds the amount which the family was eligible to
receive in that month. The regulation specifically addresses the situation in which a
family receives benefits pending the decision of a hearing examiner on the family's
eligibility. But the regulation clearly also could apply to a family already determined to
be eligible, but forced to seek a special needs income supplement, in excess of the
normal monthly AFDC check, for rent or food for that month. The state must recoup
that excess from the AFDC family, either through immediate repayment or through
subsequent reductions of that family's grant. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(13)(i)(A)(1-3)
(1988). However, for "an individual no longer receiving aid," where pursuing the
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discuss later in this article, several recent cases show how this and related
policies can work a severe hardship for AFDC families on the brink of eviction, and, consequently, of homelessness.
The other lesson derives from Quern's interpretation of the legislative
history's significance: that the supposed divergence in the histories of AFDC
and EANFC means that the principles of equity that control the one program
have no bearing on the administration of the other. Quern thus represents the
idea that states can do whatever they want with their emergency assistance
plans, unlimited by any federal strictures. At its most extreme interpretation,
Quern allows states to extend (or withhold) any kind of emergency relief, in
any amount, to any applicant.
Blum cases address issues certainly present in Quern, but
unemphasized in its holding. During the first ten years of implementation of
the EANFC program, many states' plans for EANFC treated AFDC applicants
more stingily than non-AFDC recipients: the states' statutes or regulations exacted more dramatic showings of catastrophe from, or conferred less generous benefits upon, applicants already receiving AFDC. For example,
Vermont extended EANFC to AFDC families for only four "catastrophic situations. "169 Massachusetts refused emergency assistance to AFDC recipients
alone to cover arrearages in rent or utilities payments, but allowed emergency supplements to all applicants for expenses associated with home ownership: mortgages, taxes and fuel.' 7 0 Administrative regulations in New York
denied virtually all emergency assistance to AFDC recipients, under the theory that "special needs grants" should cover most exigencies. 171 As noted

former recipient for collection proves onerous, the state may choose to forget about
the overpayment. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(13)(vi)(1988). It should be noted that these
recoupment requirements apply only to that portion of the AFDC grant for which the
state receives federal reimbursement. Ifthe state wished to use its own funds to assist
a needy child with a special needs grant, that supplement would not be counted as
income, would not affect the family's eligibility, and thus would not be recouped. 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv) (1988) (limiting this exception to states whose Title IV-A
plans have contained such a provision since before Jan. 1, 1979).
169. Lynch v. Philbrook, 550 F.2d 793, 795-6 at n.4 (2d Cir. 1977). Vermont defined eligible "emergency need" for AFDC families applying for EANFC assistance as
it defined such need for applicants to the state-financed, general assistance program:
need occasioned by death of a spouse or dependent child, court-ordered eviction,
natural disaster, or medical emergency.
170. Ingerson v. Sharp, 423 F.Supp. 139, 141 (D. Mass. 1976).
171. Several cases litigated in federal court under the SSA addressed New York
state regulations that foreclosed from eligibility for federal emergency assistance
grants any public assistance recipients whose needs could be met through the mechanism of recoupable, special needs grants. In Davis v. Smith, 431 F.Supp. 1206,
1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd., 607 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1978) plaintiffs challenged then 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.7, which channeled emergency utilities assistance to avoid shut-off
through special needs grants. Referring to the explicit mention of impending shut-off
as a covered emergency situation in the legislative history of P.L. No. 90-248, the
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above, this last discrimination was implicitly endorsed though not explicitly
addressed in the Quern decision.
In the litigation contesting these policies of differential treatment, plaintiffs
asserted the guiding judicial interpretations of AFDC- that states had to define eligibility and relief as expansively as the federal statute dictated- to
challenge these policies. Not only did the federal statute fail to discriminate
among types of emergency or kinds of aid, but it posited no difference between the income status of the parents of needy children. The restrictions in
question served neither the explicit statutory purpose nor the legislative intent. The Quern decision could have adjudicated these questions as to the
substance of the EANFC programs, but its tortuous procedural past directed
its focus to the broader issues of supremacy in the federal-state administration of public assistance. While Quern arose from a challenge to a state
EANFC plan which raised similar issues of discriminatory treatment between
AFDC and non-AFDC recipients, the decision only affirmed generally the
states' freedom from federal strictures in the operation of their emergency
assistance efforts. The Court only implicitly addressed the question of
whether that freedom extended to conferring different kinds of relief, based
on the applicants' economic status.
Blum attacked that issue head-on. Under contention in Blum was the "no
cash" provision in New York state's Social Services Law. This section precluded the grant of cash as emergency relief to AFDC recipients, or to persons eligible for AFDC, and denied reimbursement of lost or stolen cashed
public assistance checks to all public assistance recipients. 172 Relying on 45
C.F.R. § 233.10,173 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare rejected New York's provision as effectively excluding an entire class of recipients from a kind of relief.17 4 Although its earlier ruling in Quern would seem
to preclude this result, the Court approved the Department's application of
the AFDC "equal treatment" rule to the EANFC program.
court found that the regulation violated the EANFC Act. Davis, 431 F.Supp. at 1213.
In Hagans v. Berger, 536 F.2d 525, 528-9 (2d Cir. 1976), the Court ruled that a related regulation, which required disbursement of emergency rent money through
recoupable special needs grants, conformed to the letter and intent of the AFDC statute, 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(7) and (10). The court also denied appellees' claim that the
regulation violated the EANFC. Hagans, 536 F.2d at 532. For a discussion of how the
philosophy underlying the regulation disputed in Hagans, and its successors, affects
indigent families at risk for homelessness, see infra notes 198-202 and accompanying
text.
172. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 133 (1982). After the district court in Bacon v.
Toia, 493 F.Supp. 865, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) had ruled that the statute did in fact
permit the state to issue replacements for lost or stolen grants in situations of dire
emergency, plaintiffs dropped that part of their claim. Blum, 457 U.S. at 135, n.3.
173. See supra note 157, for contents of the "equal treatment" regulation, and corresponding text for discussion of its relationship to the AFDC statute at 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(10).
174. Blum, 457 U.S. at 140-41.
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The Court distinguished Quern as only addressing generally the
mandatory nature of standards for relief in the EANFC legislation. The distinction seems almost deliberately disingenuous. Construing virtually the same
legislative history as it had in Quern, the Court read the EANFC as an extension of AFDC, with an identical, not divergent, legislative goal to assist the
"dependent child." 1' 75 As such, the "equal treatment" principle of AFDC did
apply, and a state was not free to treat AFDC recipients discriminatorily either
by denying emergency relief to them, or by awarding them relief different
176
from that accorded to other applicants.
The preceding discussion suggests that Blum, without saying so, virtually
overrules Quern. The principles emerging from the cases are almost irreconcilable. One can perhaps best read the cases as illustrating two topics of
never-ending discussion in the joint federal and state administration of emergency welfare programs. One issue touches the "macro" aspects of program design. Quern echoes and amplifies for the emergency assistance
program the major tenet of federal-state welfare law: a state's choices to operate an emergency welfare program, to pick beneficiaries, and to select
types of aid, are its own, uncoerceable by the federal funding source.
Quern's most important legacy may have been to sanction criteria for the
giving of emergency relief which evoke historical issues of "deserving" and
"undeserving" destitution. It is important to note what criteria Quern left
as
permissible. Despite the intent inherent in the EANFC as in the original Social
Security Act to succor the blameless child, blame is a constant criterion in the
programs. Only barely subliminal throughout the state emergency assistance
programs described above are notions of "fault"- the presumption that
purely economic disasters result only from improvidence. Thus, homelessness arising from tornado or flood is an "emergency," but not so if it results
from non-payment of rent. 17 7 As a corollary, a victim of an "avoidable emergency"- surely an oxymoron- may not qualify for assistance. An example
of an "avoidable emergency" would, again, be eviction for non-payment of
rent, or a utility shut-off from non-payment of a gas and electric bill. The assumption is that, since the consequences of failing to pay rent or bills are fully
foreseeable, they must also be avoidable. As I have discussed earlier, living
175. Id. at 142-44.
176. Id. at 145-46.
177. The Illinois statute offers an excellent example of how, after Quern and Blum, a
state may legitimately limit the circumstances under which it will provide emergency
assistance, and the recipients to whom it will offer it. Recipients are those already
receiving or financially eligible to receive AFDC. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-12
(Smith-Hurd 1988). Events triggering eligibility for "Special Assistance," the statefunded part of the program, include homelessness for reasons other than non-payment of rent. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-12(a). "Emergency assistance," funded by
the federal program, allows assistance for eviction due to non-payment of rent, but
only if the applicant can prove that "documented theft or documented loss" of cash
led to the crisis. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.23, § 4-12(b).
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on the AFDC margin generates its own assumptions: that the failure to pay
rent is fully foreseeable and virtually always unavoidable. 178 The difference
between the assumptions contained in some EANFC programs, and this second group of assumptions, is that the former are anachronisms; the latter are
provable from data that intimate what it means to live on the margin.
Blum addresses the other major issue in welfare policy: the "micro" issue of resource adjustment among beneficiaries, after beneficiaries are chosen and overall resources are allocated. Under Blum, once a state does
commit itself in an emergency welfare program to extend benefits to different
classes of recipients, it must offer equal benefits equally: the state scheme
clearly cannot work to the disadvantage of AFDC recipients. At that point, the
state's EANFC program operates, as would its AFDC program, under the
same federal programmatic constraints. Explicitly or implicitly, the controversy adjudicated in Blum reflected- and, as we shall see, continues to reflect- a tension forever alive in the politics of welfare policy: whether
dispensing extraordinary relief to individuals already receiving support from
the state constitutes "double dipping," and accords them an unfair economic
advantage over not only their contemporaries who receive only periodic welfare payments, but also over their neighbors who receive no welfare at all.
Recent emergency assistance cases, whether litigated in state or federal
fora, reveal a patternless patchwork of statutes, regulations, guidelines, and
practices. Plaintiffs have challenged social workers' refusal to characterize
utility shut-offs as "unanticipated emergencies," and thus as triggering eligibility for emergency aid; 1 7 9 a state's practice of forcing applicants to wait
twelve months in between applications; 180 state regulations limiting emergency assistance to children under nineteen and withholding it altogether
from families in which parental fault contributed to eviction; 18 1 and a jurisdiction's failure, despite its maintenance of an emergency program on paper, to
178. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text, concerning relationships between HUD's "fair market rents" and AFDC payments.
179. In Wenzel v. Meeker County Welfare Board, the social services department
denied emergency utilities assistance to two families with unemployed custodial parents, one laid-off, one incapacitated by alcoholism. Both families subsisted on AFDC.
The reason for the denial was that utility shut-off was the "foreseeable result of nonpayment of utility bills." Wenzel, 346 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The
court found no justification for this construction in the state statute or regulations.
Wenzel, 346 N.W.2d at 684.
180. Mullaney v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 613, 403
N.E.2d 427, 429 (1980) (state's administrative practice of requiring twelve months to
elapse between applications for EANFC is a permissible interpretation of state and
federal EANFC prohibition on distributing emergency assistance more frequently than
for one thirty day period every twelve months).
181. Maine Association of Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Commissioner, Maine
Department of Human Services, Civ. Action Docket #88-0288-B, partial consent order entered (D.Me. February 15, 1989) (challenge under the SSA to departmental
manual provisions).
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provide service consistently and quickly at all. 1 82 Indeed, apart from the allconsuming area of emergency shelter, all that remains of litigation over emergency assistance seems to be disputes over implementation of concededly
permissible state legislative and regulatory standards.
There are two exceptions. French v. Mansour, 18 3 is significant for its
treatment of the confluence of AFDC and the emergency program. The Sixth
Circuit's decision reveals a perversely logical extension of Blum v. Bacon:
that if a state must treat AFDC recipients as well as any other applicants for
EANFC, then it must treat EANFC applicants as poorly as it does AFDC recipients. Michigan's Department of Social Services originally denied AFDC benefits to the plaintiff in French because she had refused to disclose the identity
of the father of one of her children. While Ms. French received no money for
herself from AFDC, her three children received their share of the grant, described by the court as including allowances for shelter and utilities.1 84 The
administrative guidelines for Michigan's Emergency Needs Program required
a family to have exhausted all other resources before applying. 1 8 5 Since Ms.
182. Feeling v. Barry, Civil Action No.82-2994, consent judgment entered (D.D.C.
March 12, 1986); order deferring ruling on plaintiffs' petition for contempt entered
(January 28, 1988). Plaintiffs in Feeling originally alleged violations of the SSA and
Fifth Amendment due process violations for the District of Columbia's failure to provide immediate emergency relief, or to offer any mechanism for expedited hearings
after denials of claims. Consent Judgment at 1. The Consent Judgment required distribution of emergency assistance within eight days from completion of the application, Consent Judgment at 2; filing of applications and interviewing of applicants on
the day on which applicants apply, Consent Judgment at 3; and rendering of any
hearing decision within forty days after the applicant requested a hearing, Consent
Judgment at 4. The District's recently enacted "Emergency Assistance Program Act
of 1988," D.C. Reg. 553 (1989), codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-1001 et seq., sets a
time limit of eight business days from application to distribution of the emergency aid,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-1004(a); sets income eligibility standards for applicants, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 3-1008; and defines "emergency" as "a... situation in which immediate
action is necessary to avoid destitution, establish or re-establish a home, or provide
for the immediate needs of an eligible applicant to relieve or prevent serious harm or
prevent displacement from a home." D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-1001(6).
183. French v. Mansour, 834 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1987).
184. French, 834 F.2d at 117. Title IV of the Social Security Act compels the disclosure of the paternity of a dependent child as a condition of assistance. Ifthe applicant
for assistance, presumably the mother, refuses to reveal the identity of the child's
father, she will be excluded from the AFDC unit. Her children will receive benefits, but
only as paid through a protective payee. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (1985, 1989
Supp.) .
185. The text of the applicable portion from Michigan's Emergency Needs Manual
was quoted by the court as follows:
An applicant must pursue all potential resources in order to qualify for Emergency Needs Program. This means agreeing to take all reasonable actions
necessary to obtain a resource and refraining from actions that cause the
loss or delay in receipt of any income or resource.
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French had refused to comply with AFDC requirements, and thus had not
taken advantage of that resource, the agency rejected her subsequent request for emergency assistance to prevent termination of her utilities

service. 186
The district court had stricken the administrative guideline as violating
the "equal treatment" 18 7 regulation under the AFDC program. This result
was clearly unwarranted in light of Quern, since Quern had ruled that the
equal treatment rule of AFDC did not apply to the historically distinguishable
federal emergency assistance program. 18 8 Arguably- but not stronglythe lower court's interpretation was justifiable under Blum, which viewed
EANFC as a natural scion of the original AFDC scheme, bound by the same
intent and principles. The appellate court overruled, and upheld the offending
guideline under exactly the same rationale: if an applicant's behavior disqualified her for AFDC, then it disqualified her for EANFC. 18 9
French underscores confusions that underly the emergency assistance
program's implementation. Nothing could be clearer than that the French
holding violates the intent of the EANFC legislation, since emergency assistance was originally meant for those ineligible for AFDC. As noted earlier,
under EANFC as originally conceived, benefits could be denied to an entire
family if its destitution arose from only one member's refusal to accept work.
It was a punitive, over-inclusive disqualification, one more brutal than the typical disqualification from AFDC for failure of one family member to comply with
a condition of eligibility. But it was the only non-financial, implied criterion for
eligibility in the program, and the only federal legislative basis for exclusion
from it. In contrast, as the circumstances in the French case suggest, there
are many conditions of cooperation for receiving AFDC. Disclosure of the
paternity of a dependent child is one; work registration is another;1 90 refraining from going out on stike is a third. 1 9 1 Tying eligibility for emergency
aid to eligibility for AFDC presents a whole host of possible other situations
under which one family member's refusal to cooperate with the AFDC proFrench, 834 F.2d at 117.
186. Id.at 117.
187. See supra note 157.
188. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
189. French, 834 F.2d at 118.
190. See supra notes 147-153 and accompanying text.
191. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 602(a)(21)(A) (1985) excludes being out on strike as "good
cause" sufficient to justify unemployment of a family member. This provision also
disqualifies the entire family of a striker from assistance during the month of participation in the strike. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(21)(B) (1985). After the amendments under the
Family Support Act become effective, the striker provision will remain as the only part
of Title IV-A of the SSA which eliminates an entire family from the AFDC rolls as the
result of the activity of one member of the family. For the upholding of a similar absolute disqualification of the family of a striker from receiving food stamps, at 7 U.S.C.
§ 2015 (d)(3)(1985), see Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 108 S.Ct. 1185
(1988).
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gram may exclude not only that member from AFDC, but also the whole family from EANFC.
Particularly under the major amendments to the AFDC program contained in the Family Support Act of 1988, any extension of the French reasoning could hold calamitous consequences for hard-pressed families. The Act
expands the conditions of cooperation, and thus creates more opportunities
for disqualification. It re-emphasizes the sanctions for failure to cooperate
with its child support enforcement mechanisms, 192 and adds new programs,
for which the cost of refusing to participate is the forfeiture of the recalcitrant
recipient's AFDC benefits. Most notable among these programs is the
"JOBS" program, which requires AFDC recipients to enroll in work, training,
or basic educational programs, and also assists states in providing day care
and transportation services. 19 3 Early criticism of "JOBS" and of drafts of its
regulations suggests that many participants will find the logistics of participation to be extraordinarily onerous. 194

192. Effective July 1, 1989, Title IV-A of the Social Security Act was amended to
emphasize a state's responsibility to require applicants and recipients of AFDC "... to
cooperate in the establishment of paternity and the enforcement of child support obligations .. " Family Support Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, 2409
[to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(44)(B)]. The Family Support Act left undisturbed
the disqualification from assistance of the applicant who refused to disclose the identity of the father of the dependent children. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1985, 1989
Supp).
193. Title IIof the Family Support Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 2343, 2356, establishes the
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program ("JOBS"). Title II amends the
Social Security Act in two ways: by adding the substance of the "JOBS" program,
102 Stat. 2343,2360 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 681-684); and by amending the
former work and training requirements at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) to conform to the
new substantive provisions. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102
Stat. 2343, 2356. As I mentioned earlier, see supra note 149, the previous version of
the SSA penalized any one family member who refused without good cause to work.
194. Early criticism of the Department of Health and Human Services' proposed
regulations has focused on the narrowing of eligibility for child care; on the federal
funding formulae that provide incentives to states to encourage participation in potentially unproductive activities, such as make-work community service jobs or job hunting; and on burdensome standards, such as those which require a recipient to enroll
in work or work-related activities as far as two hours away from her home. GREENBERG, JOBS REGS: A FIRST LOOK AT SOME BIG PROBLEMS (Center for Law and Social
Policy reprint, 1989). The Department has issued the regulations in final form, with
little change. 54 Fed. Reg. 42146 (October 13, 1989). It should also be noted that the
"JOBS" program benefits in some ways depend upon the requirements pertaining to
the disclosure of paternity. Effective April 1, 1990, under the Family Support Act, 102
Stat. 2343, 2384 [to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(g)(1)(A)(vi)(ll)], a recipient who
has refused to cooperate with the child support enforcement requirements will also
lose her eligibility for child care services. Arguably, this exclusion might make no
difference. A recipient who has witheld information about the paternity of her child will
already have lost her share of AFDC. If loss of her child care makes it impossible for
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The amended AFDC statute offers more chances to disqualify certain recipients from assistance. But even with some family members excluded from
the grant, the dependent children in the family should still receive their share
of the monthly check. In contrast, as the experience of the French family suggested, the family excluded in part from AFDC is excluded in full from
EANFC. The reasons are practical, and not explicitly spelled out in any state
emergency assistance statute. While a monthly AFDC grant consists of cash,
and is apportionable, emergency assistance is likely to take non-divisible
forms: a voucher, or vendor payment to the landlord or the utility, for the
exact amount of rent or of the fuel bill; or in-kind contributions of food, clothing, or furniture. One can all too easily fill in the facts from the French, or any
indigent, family's story: one family member flubs her AFDC-mandated work
assignment; she loses her eligibility for AFDC, and the whole family's income
shrinks; the family comes up short for the rent or the electric bill; the family
seeks an emergency relief check to avert the disaster, and is turned away.
This outcome is possible in any state that requires exhaustion of all resources
as a prerequisite to applying for emergency relief, and that considers AFDC
to be a resource.1 9 5
The importation into the federal emergency assistance program of
AFDC's burgeoning eligibility criteria would change emergency assistance
from a program the sole goal of which was to prevent complete destitution, to
one that is simply another enforcement mechanism for the broader social
goals of AFDC. AFDC's non-financial criteria clearly seek to encourage or
punish certain behaviors. EANFC initially served no such purpose. It was a
program meant to provide quick, economic relief. Relief could be unconditional precisely because it was intended to be temporary; there was no need
to attach strings to one-time grants. It was never contemplated that benefits
would be denied because a family's destitution arose from one member's
disqualification from AFDC, even if that disqualification resulted from a refusal
to seek work. Of course, in 1968, when EANFC was legislated, it was never
contemplated that "emergency shelter" was a condition that could last for
months.
So far, there is no evidence that significant numbers of families who receive AFDC, and who depend not once, but month after month on the emergency assistance structure to cover their shelter costs, are being thrown off
her to continue working, she will suffer no further penalty, since the loss of the individual's share of AFDC benefits is also the cost of failure to participate in the JOBS
program.
195. An excellent example of a state plan which predicates eligibility for assistance
on actual receipt of, or eligibility for, AFDC, is that recently enacted in California. California covers emergency shelter needs through its AFDC special needs program, and
conditions the funding of emergency shelter on the applying family's having "used all
available liquid resources." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE Sec. 11450(f) (West Supp.
1989). For a description of the evolution of this legislation, see infra notes 211-215
and accompanying text.
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AFDC, and thus off EANFC, and thus out of their hotel rooms, because they
are refusing either to report for work, or to disclose the identity of their children's fathers. 19 6 No data exists on whether the logistical and psychological
barriers that living in shelters places in the way of work and education have
prevented AFDC recipients from participating in the current mandatory work
programs. As a corollary, no data exists on whether AFDC recipients who
live in shelters and have been unable to work have been sanctioned in those
states that had already operated mandatory work programs before passage
of the Family Support Act. Nor is there any indication that AFDC families in
danger of eviction, and therefore at risk for homelessness, have violated the
non-financial conditions of AFDC and thereby forfeited the supplementary
funds that would avert the tragedy. This problem suggests an area of potential, rather than yet proven vulnerability, for the poorest of the poor. But it
does point out the risks to the stability of precariously housed families posed
by the arbitrary convergence of welfare policy with "disaster" relief, risks
generated in the first place by the faulty identification of shelter as an emergency need to be paid for with emergency funds.
The second area of litigation concerns the possible direction of emergency assistance to prevent homelessness. Policies setting the relationship
between AFDC and emergency assistance frustrate that direction. I have already noted policies that dismiss evictions or utilities shut-offs as "foreseeable" and thus not true "emergencies," or that deny supplementary
payments to public assistance recipients on the theory that they can cover the
emergency through an advance on their grants. 19 ' When these two policies
converge, disaster results. In a sense, the latter welfare policy differs little
from the emergency assistance policy articulated by Michigan's welfare department in the French litigation. It, too, assumes that the welfare grant is a
primary, and satisfactory, resource.
Several recent New York state court decisions suggest the harm inherent in those emergency assistance policies that ignore the truth about the
196. Few surveys exist which actually document the sources of income for the residents of emergency shelters. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text, for a
discussion of the characteristics of shelter residents, as reported in surveys conducted in New York City and Massachusetts. See also supra note 139 and accompanying text, not all governmentally funded emergency shelter is paid for through
EANFC; some is funded through states' special needs programs, as integrated into
their AFDC structures. For families in these AFDC programs, disqualification from
AFDC would also mean disqualification from the special needs shelter program under
AFDC. In an unpublished conference paper, the AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE AssocIATION (APWA) did note a finding by an Urban Institute study that only a third of homeless families eligible for AFDC actually receive it. The Welfare System Response to
Homelessness: A System of Last Resort at 8 (Johns Hopkins Institute for Public Policy Studies, Nat'l Conference on Homeless Children and Youth, Apr. 25-28, 1989).
197. See supra note 171, on New York's "recoupable advance" policy, and infra
notes 203-206, on a discussion in one decision about the administrative characterization of the disastrous consequences of normal economic hardship as "foreseeable."
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relationship between housing costs, the possible economic reasons for displacement from housing, and the financial resources available to an indigent
person. One, Hardman v. D'Elia, demonstrates the operation of New York's
policy to cover Aousing emergencies through recoupable advances of an
AFDC recipient's "shelter allowance," the separate part of the monthly
check specifically allocated towards shelter. 198 The plaintiff and her children,
all AFDC recipients, were evicted despite their having paid their rent. Presumably, although the decision does not so indicate, they had exhausted
their shelter allowance. They received supplemental assistance to secure a
new apartment- not through EANFC, but through an advance on the next
month's shelter allowance. As a condition of receiving the grant, the mother
agreed to allow the Department of Social Services to recoup ten percent of
her grant per month until she had paid the advance back.1 99 One does not
need to read too many facts into the opinion to surmise that this was not
exactly an arms'-length agreement. The trial court had vacated the recoupment, a decision that the appellate court affirmed. The decision was based
not so much on the coercive aspect of the recoupment "agreement," but
Department's failure to prove that the children's needs could actually be
served by 90% of their usual monthly grant.2 ° °
Given the relationship between welfare grants and representative rent in
the New York metropolitan area, it is of course doubtful that the Hardman
family's needs could be met at 100% of their grant. 20 1 But it takes little to
198. Thirty-six AFDC jurisdictions have "fully consolidated" their need and payment
standards, so that they neither separately enumerate the basic living expenses such
as food, shelter, and heat which the total grant is supposed to cover, nor pay these
amounts separately. New York state is one of the remaining jurisdictions which lists
shelter, among other needs, separately. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Report No.22 (Need and Amount of Assistance,
Basic Needs Standards-Consolidated) and Report No.25 (Need and Amount of
Assistance; Shelter Separate from Basic Needs) (1989). New York issues a separate
check for shelter to the recipient, which, as of January 1988, amounted in New York
City to $286 for a family of four. Jiggetts v. Grinker, No.34995, 148 A.2d 1, 543
N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). The regulation which essentially treats an advance of a shelter allowance as a resource which must be exhausted before emergency assistance will be granted is codified at 18 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
37202(a)(2).
199. Hardman v. D'Elia, 141 A.D.2d 544, 545, 529 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988), appeal dismissed, 74 N.Y.2d 716, 541 N.E.2d 430 (1989).
200. Id. at 544-45, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
201. Each of New York's social service jurisdictions sets its own shelter allowances, and therefore its own monthly AFDC payment. Data published by the
House Committee on Ways and Means lists 1989 grant levels for New York City and
Suffolk County only, and not for Nassau County, the home of the Hardman family. But
these levels, at $638 and $775 per month respectively for a family of four, in the first
case barely cover and in the second do not meet HUD's fair market rents (FMRs) for
even two bedroom apartments for the New York City and Nassau-Suffolk metropolitan
areas: $593 and $789. For the figures on monthly AFDC grants, see Committee Staff,
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imagine the danger to a family's stability from the loss of one-tenth of a
monthly income of four to five hundred dollars, and of which, as I noted earlier, a full 60% may go immediately towards shelter. Clearly, the court in
Hardman had no trouble with the arithmetic, or with the possible consequences of a reduction in so limited and inflexible an income: an inability to
pay rent or other bills in the future, another eviction, and another application
for extraordinary relief. The policy that the court enunciated, and that the
defendant violated- that of tempering any recoupment decision with an appraisal of the family's potential financial suffering- is not only humane, but
economically realistic. It also effectively nullifies the recoupment policy.
Just one tiny case among what is undoubtedly a plethora of unreported
instances, Hardman tells us nothing about the times when a welfare recipient,
perhaps unrepresented, never challenges a recoupment; or about how often
a county decides against exacting one; or about how often evictions or homelessness ensue from the operation of the policy. But the case does raise a
question: if a recoupment can be so readily excused, by a showing of hardship- which is so readily made- then why continue it? Why require of
AFDC families the formalism of borrowing against their future grants, to cover
unpredicted, catastrophic needs? Not only is the policy potentially honored
more in the waiver than in the observance, but it is arguably illegal under the
principles enunciated in Blum that require equitable treatment of AFDC and
non-AFDC applicants for emergency assistance. Unlike Ms. Hardman, an
applicant who is not already receiving and will never receive AFDC, but who
may temporarily qualify financially for emergency assistance, will never have
to pay anyone back.2 ° 2
The reason for insistence upon the recoupment policy can only be that
the concern about promoting equity and standardization within the welfare
program demands it. The basic monthly welfare shelter allowance is supposed to take care of housing needs; theoretically, to give more to anyone
who, for whatever reason, cannot stretch that allowance to meet those needs
confers an unfair advantage on that one recipient. "Equity" requires that the
favored individual restore the balance by paying the windfall back. As we
have seen, this rationale is based on a myth: the adequacy of the shelter
allowance. Since the grant may never meet the rent, trying to cover what are
in effect permanent housing needs through a temporary supplement to the
welfare grant can mean playing a perpetual game of catch-up.
Nelson v. Grinker2 °3 illustrates two problems arising from the expedient
Background Data and Materials on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 541 (1989). For the HUD Fair
Market Rents for Existing Housing, see 54 Fed. Reg. 39868-39921 (Sept. 28, 1989).
202. For a discussion of the Blum case, see supra notes 172-176 and accompanying text. For a discussion of possible outcomes of Quern v. Mandley, which suggests
that that Supreme Court decision may sanction precisely the sort of policy enacted by
New York state, see supra note 168 and accompanying text.
203. Nelson v. Grinker, 138 Misc.2d 60, 524 N.Y.S,2d 131 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1987).
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of using extraordinary welfare grants to meet on-going housing needs. One
consists of another application of this principle of welfare equity, this time
extended to non-welfare recipients. The other problem shows how the Quern
decision has allowed misconceptions about the avoidability of destitution and
homelessness to be translated into an emergency assistance policy totally
inappropriate to the provision of shelter.
The facts demonstrate the narrowness of the economic margin between
security and disaster. The Nelsons for the 1950's- Ozzie and Harrietmade manageable monthly payments on a split-level ranch; these Nelsons
for the 80's owed one thousand dollars to their landlord for back rent, and
were about to be evicted. The landlord agreed to a stay in the execution of
the warrant for possession, to give Mr. Nelson time to pay the money back.
Immediately afterwards, both Mr. and Mrs. Nelson lost their jobs: he through
a disabling back injury, she through quitting to care for her dying mother.
When, after not receiving the back rent as planned, the landlord re-activated
the eviction, the Nelsons applied for funds under the federal emergency
assistance program. The New York City Department of Social Services
(DSS) found them to be ineligible, for two reasons: their situation was predictable, and thus controllable, and therefore did not satisfy a key statutory
the4 problem exceeded the welcriterion; and the amount needed to alleviate 20
fare shelter allowance, a regulatory criterion.
In reversing the administrative denial of assistance, the court discussed
both the agency's refusal to categorize the Nelson's situation as an "emergency," and the Nelsons as "destitute," and the wisdom of its former regulation limiting emergency housing assistance to the level of the welfare shelter
allowance. The court saw the "emergency" over which the Nelsons had no
control as their unpredictable loss of earned income after they agreed to a
repayment plan. The court relied on these facts to find eligilibity, and did not
evaluate the merits of the agency's claim that the original eviction, arising as
the anticipated consequence of a repeated failure to pay rent, was "controllable" and thus not an emergency. 20 5 As for the former shelter allowance policy under which the Nelsons' application was originally denied, the court
interpreted its revision as proof of its irrationality.
As the court noted, "Here is an opportunity for DSS to avoid the creation
of yet another homeless family.''206 The court recognized in the Nelsons'
circumstances a case study not only of how people become homeless, but of
how they end up in welfare hotels. If evicted for want of an emergency assistance grant, one denied because the amount was greater than the shelter

204. Id. at 61, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 132. During the pendency of this litigation, the city's
Human Resources Administration revised this guideline to allow a one-time emergency assistance grant to avoid eviction, conditioned on a showing that the applicant
owed less than a year's worth of back rent, was without other resources, and had
received no similar assistance within the preceding twelve months. Id.
205. Id. at 62, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
206. Id. at 63, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 133.
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allowance, then the Nelsons might well have found their only housing in the
Hotel Martinique. Although the city would not pay one thousand dollars to
clear up the Nelsons' back rent, and enable them to stay in their apartment, it
would have proceeded to spend double that amount every month, under its
special needs rate for hotel shelter.
We have seen here the operation of two welfare policies in the context of
housing emergencies- not the physical destruction of dwellings by fire or
flood, but the physical ejection of occupants who cannot pay rent. One policy
implies that the uninnocent victims of strictly structural economic emergencies do not deserve the state's help. The other demands a strict equality
among all recipients of the state's largesse. Both policies rest upon the assumption that profligacy precedes poverty; that those who cannot cover
housing expenses through a welfare grant must somehow have wasted the
check, and may not, without conditions, receive any more; and that the only
possible justification for needing more money is the misfortune caused
through totally unpredictable natural disaster. As the New Jersey Supreme
Court perceptively noted in a different context, the consequence is "a paradox for adminsitrators who are paying thousands of dollars in rent under EA
while required to maintain that the standards of need under AFDC is theoretically being met in that flat AFDC grant. '207 The policies combine to guarantee hotel living, the biggest waste of all, and an outcome perhaps covertly
regarded as fitting punishment for those perceived to be unable to manage
their money.
VI.

STRATEGIES FOR ASSERTING ENTITLEMENTS TO SHELTER
THROUGH EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

One area in which the states' freedom to set criteria for emergency
assistance has clearly affected the types and recipients of relief has been in
providing emergency shelter relief for families. Consistently over the past five
years, the District of Columbia has assisted two and a half times as many,
and New York state more than ten times as many, families through each jurisdiction's EANFC program as has California. 2 ° 8 Criteria for the District of Columbia's emergency assistance program are broad, and were, until recently,
more or less ad hoc, allowing emergency shelter assistance to both AFDC
and non-AFDC recipients. 20 9 In the wake of the Blum decision, New York's
207. Franklin v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, 111 N.J. 1, 10, 543
A.2d 1, 5 (1988).
208. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE: NUMBER OF CASES, FISCAL YEAR 1985, (June 16, 1986). In
1985 there were 734 in California, 968 in the District of Columbia, and 4,473 in New
York. For fiscal 1988, these totals were 619 in California, 1,690 in the District, and
8,335 in New York. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE:

(Apr. 10, 1989)[hereinafter "CASES"].
209. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE,

NUMBER OF CASES, FISCAL YEAR

1988

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHAR-
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Social Services Law now provides relief commensurate with the federal outlines, to both AFDC and non-AFDC families.2 1 ° It may be unduly obvious to
say so, but it is clear that those states which have exercised their options
under Quern to impose the fewest restrictions on categories of recipients and
of relief have incurred the heaviest expenses for emergency shelter.
California's example illustrates the options left open to states for structuring federal financial participation in emergency relief. Until February 1, 1988,
when amendments to California's Welfare and Institutions Code provided up
to a month of emergency shelter assistance to AFDC and AFDC-eligible families as a "non-recurring special need, ' 2 11 California paid only limited
amounts for family shelter. AFDC families who had exhausted all other resources were eligible for up to no more than $600 of one-time assistance
under the special needs program, for emergencies "caused by sudden and
unusual circumstances beyond the control of the needy family." "Emergency
housing needs," and replacement of clothing and furniture were the only acceptable special needs under the statute.21 2 Emergency assistance under
the EANFC program was available to only two categories of recipients: to
two-parent AFDC families, in order to maintain the child in a home, and to
children for emergency shelter care outside of the home, in instances of alleged abuse or neglect. 2 13 Neither provision assisted the one-parent destitute family already cast out on the street. That the latter provision not only
failed to help such families, but actually encouraged the fracturing of homeless families for the purpose of sheltering the child, was lost on neither legislators nor litigators. Liberalization of California's welfare code closely
followed litigation that successfully challenged the practice of providing emergency shelter assistance only in the guise of emergency shelter, or foster

ACTERISTICS OF STATE PLANS FOR AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN UNDER
TITLE IV-A OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 66 (1988)[hereinafter "STATE PLANS"].

Under the Emergency Shelter Services for Family Program, D.C. CODE ANN. § 3206.3 to 3-206.8 (1988), see supra note 19 and accompanying text, the District has
stated intentions to control the physical conditions of shelter, for the AFDC and nonAFDC families residing in shelter paid for by EANFC. Under the more recently enacted Emergency Assistance Program Act of 1988, see supra note 182, the District
has clarified financial eligibility requirements for AFDC and non-AFDC applicants, and
provided a broad range of coverable emergencies fully consistent with the federal
EANFC statute.
210. STATE PLANS, supra note 209, at 204.
211. Stats. 1987, c.1353, § 1, eff. date Feb. 1, 1988, codified at CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 11450 (f)(2), (f)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
212. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450 (e)(2) (West Supp. 1989) superseded by
Stats. 1987, c.1353 § 1, codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE Sec. 11450 (West Supp.
1989).
213.

STATE PLANS, supra

note 209, at 45. CAL.

WELFS & INST. CODE §

16500, et

seq, provide for the sheltering of homeless children, but the legislation exists in the
context of removal of allegedly abused or neglected children from their homes.
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care. 214 California's special needs expenditures for emergency temporary
shelter assistance now approach in2amount
the EANFC funds that New York
15
now spends for the same purpose.

In contrast, Maryland, with a total of 6,440 children documented as
homeless for school-year 1988-89,216 reported only 1,859 emergency assistance cases for the average month of FY 1988.21 The reason rests simply

with the highly restrictive scope of benefits under the states' emergency
assistance plan (for a family, limited to one grant of $250, receivable only
once in twelve months) and the equally restrictive definition of emergency
need (that resulting from a court-ordered eviction or physical put-out from an
on-going living arrangement). 21 8 A recent directive from the state's Department of Human Resources has narrowed further the applicability of even
these criteria to exclude a homelessness shelter from the definition of "ongoing living arrangement," and consequently to deny assistance to families
or individuals in their transition out of shelter into more permanent living arrangements.219 Maryland's statutes and regulations exemplify how much
214. See Hansen v. Department of Social Services, 193 Cal.App.3d 283, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 232, 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). Advocates had long noted that the effect of California's restriction of emergency shelter assistance to children eligible to enter foster
care was to offer families the brutal choice of remaining homeless, or finding shelter
for their children in a foster family or institution. HOUSE COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS,
HOMELESS FAMILIES: A NEGLECTED CRISIS, H.R. No.982, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9

(1986) (quoting Gary Blasi, staff attorney, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles);
Emergency Aid to Families Program: Hearing before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1986)(Statement of JoAnne
Ross). For a discussion of the Hansen decision, which was based on statutory construction, in the larger context of asserting the fundamental right to family integrity as a
basis for claiming a right to family shelter, see Comment, Homeless Families: Do
They Have a Right to Integrity? 35 UCLA L. REV. 159, 196 (1987).
215. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, USE OF THE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND AFDC PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE SHELTER TO FAMILIES 16 (Report to Con-

gress, July, 1989.)
216. Of these children, 1,524 lived with their mothers in domestic violence shelters;
1,847 were placed in motels; and 2,902 were sheltered in emergency and transitional
shelters.

217.

PUBLIC SERVICES BRANCH, MD. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., 2

(1988-89).

1988 supra note 208.
218. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 131-137 (1985 & Cum. Supp. 1989); MD. REGS.
CODE tit. 07, § 07.03-08.05B (1989).
219. Department of Human Resources, Income Maintenance Administration, IMA
Inquiry Response No. OPA 89-5-AFDC: Definition and Verification of an Eviction for
EA/AFDC at 2 (Sept. 1, 1988). My thanks to my fellow contributor, Peter Sabonis, for
alerting me to and sending to me a copy of this policy statement. That my access to
this information came from a friend, and not from a published source, underscores a
problem in researching welfare law issues. The enormous discretion given to state
legislatures under judicial interpretation of the Social Security Act, and then to state
agencies under traditional concepts of administrative deference, means that most
state welfare law is not in fact published: it is the creature of unpublished internal
CASES,
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freedom states enjoy under Quern to apply highly selective criteria to their
emergency assistance programs- and to exclude many needy families from
help.
With the latitude given to states in the content of their emergency assistance programs, it-should come as no surprise that the litigation asserting
entitlements to emergency shelter for families is scattered in theme. Two
main types of cases emerge: those that do challenge the substance of the
state's plan for delivering emergency shelter through EANFC or through the
special needs component of AFDC; and those that strive to impose order on
the actual delivery of emergency assistance. The best examples of the former were litigated in state courts in New York and in New Jersey. For examples of the latter, one can look to federal court, used as a forum for
articulating entitlements not only to due process under the federal constitution, but also to specific treatment under the Social Security Act. Success
under both scenarios has been mixed, but issues of abstention and, ostensibly, standing have clouded the results of the cases brought in the federal
arena.
The case of Maticka v. City of Atlantic City 220 successfully challenged
what we have already seen to be the omnipresent assumption that except in
the case of cataclysmic occurrences, individuals should be able to manage
on fixed incomes. Plaintiffs in Maticka were denied emergency shelter based
on the Division of Welfare's interpretation of the state EANFC regulation. The
regulation allowed the award of emergency assistance if families were homeless due to "fire, flood or other similar natural disaster, or (when) because of
an emergent situation over which they had no control or opportunity to plan in
advance. ' 22 1 The Division interpreted many situations under which tenants
might have notice of imminent dispossession, such as condemnation or eviction, as ones in which tenants enjoyed an "opportunity to plan" because they
received formal notice. Plaintiffs opposed this conclusion under the theory
that its implied "fault" standard thwarted the purpose of the state's AFDC
statute to care for the dependent child.2 22 Despite the long history of EANFC
litigation as I have described it, none of the parties argued over the general
applicability of principles of AFDC to an evaluation of the state's emergency
assistance program.2 2 3 Referring specifically to the existence of extensive
documentation of the unavailability of affordable housing, the court found it to
agency memoranda and guidelines, and thus not uniformly accessible. This agency
directive is just one example of an unpublished policy which will affect the implementation of the state's emergency assistance program, but which is only well-known to
those practicing in the field. The policy at issue in French v. Mansour, supra note 185,
similarly was contained not in published statutes or regulations, but in the social services agency's Emergency Needs Manual.
220. 216 N.J. Super. 434, 524 A.2d 416 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
221. Id. at 439, 524 A.2d at 418 (N.J.A.C. 10: 82-5.10(c)).
222. Id. at 440, 524 A.2d at 419.
223. Id. at 446, 524 A.2d at 423.
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be "unrealistic and therefore arbitrary and unreasonable" for the Division to
equate formal notice of impending disaster with control over it.2 24 The court
held that an assessment of "opportunity to plan" had to include an evaluation
of "realistic capacity to plan for substitute housing within the notice period. "225 In response to the decision in Maticka, the state Department of
Human Services subsequently incorporated the "realistic capacity to plan"
standard into its criteria for eligibility for emergency shelter assistance.2 2 s
Plaintiffs in Maticka also addressed the ninety day regulatory maximum
imposed for placement in emergency shelter. On this claim, the court also
appraised the housing situation and the state's attempts to provide other solutions for homelessness, and remanded the case to the respondent state
Department of Human Services for rulemaking subject to factual development.2 27 After the state had indeed revised the regulation to increase the
limit on shelter stays for families to five months, homeless families sought to
raise the limit again. In Franklin v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, 2 28 plaintiffs argued that the state's regulatory limit violated statutory
mandates under the state's AFDC and EANFC plans for the provision of shelter; and both substantive and, impliedly, equal protection provisions of the
New Jersey state constitution.22 9
The court denied all of plaintiffs' claims. Disposing quickly of the constitutional claim, it interpreted the state constitution as guaranteeing negative
rights to freedom from interference with acquiring the means of subsistence,
and not as bestowing affirmative rights. 230 The court refuted that the state's
AFDC plan required any particular type of benefit at all, let alone a quality or
duration of emergency shelter.2 31 The court instead gave its most prolonged
attention to the equal protection issue: the claim that, where families with limited incomes face housing with unlimited rents, to eject homeless families
from emergency shelter after five months is in no rational way related to the
goal of preventing homelessness. Here the court quoted at length from reports and testimony from the state's Department of Human Resources. The
majority was persuaded of the rationality of diverting funds from makeshift
hotel housing to more permanent solutions. As significantly, the majority
noted the Department's guarantees that case by case evaluation would as-

224. Id. at 451, 524 A.2d at 425.
225. Id. at 452, 524 A.2d at 426.
226. Id. at 456, 524 A.2d at 428.
227. Id. at 456, 524 A.2d at 428.
228. 225 N.J. Super. 504, 543 A.2d 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), aff'd 111
N.J. 1, 543 A.2d 1 (1988).
229. Id. at 61. Both the Superior Court Appellate Division and the New Jersey
Supreme Court addressed these claims, and disposed of them similarly. I will refer in
the discussion to the substantively more comprehensive review given by the Appellate
Division.
230. Id. at 68.
231. Id. at 62.
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sure that families could still fall back upon emergency shelter as a last
resort.2 3 2
However, ultimately reasonable the goal of channeling public funds into
real housing for homeless people, in her dissent, Judge Pressler found the
interim result-the displacement of homeless families until such housing
could be secured-less than reasonable. She suggested, first, that the maintenance of homeless families in emergency shelter until the state could locate
permanent housing for them would constitute simply an extension of policy
already articulated administratively. 23 3 Second, she offered that, even without such clear policy, the court could exercise its power as "parenspatriae"
to safeguard vulnerable citizens.23 4 But, despite plaintiffs' losses, it is instructive to remember what had happened in the process: in Maticka, the
court had refused to sanction automatically a three month limit on emergency
shelter, and had demanded serious showings from the respondents that their
plans to limit emergency shelter were motivated by genuine desires to find
more constructive ways of ending homelessness.
As a result of the different circumstances of the succession of plaintiffsintervenors in New York's McCain case, that litigation aired every issue possible in any controversy over governmental obligations to provide temporary
shelter: the existence of any entitlement; the extent, both in duration and quality, of any that existed; and notice of the entitlement and access to it. The
procedural course of the case ordained that at no time in the course of the
litigation would any court issue a final ruling on the merits on any of the significant constitutional or statutory claims for relief.23 5 But both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals ventured further than their New Jersey
counterparts had to venture in order to support the claim of an entitlement to
shelter, the insistence upon uniform administration of EANFC as a component
of the AFDC program, and the power of the judiciary actually to dictate some
of the terms of a welfare program.
The Appellate Division found preliminarily persuasive plaintiff-intervenors' claim that the state's emergency assistance to families (EAF) plan im232. Id. at 64-6.
233. Id. at 76. In a case concerning a regulatory limit of one hundred days on emergency shelter, under the state's AFDC special needs program, a Connecticut trial
court has recently ruled that a proper interpretation of the state's policies and its AFDC
statute requires the state to maintain families in emergency housing until it can find
permanent units for them. Savage v. Aronson, CV NH 8904-3142 (Conn. Super. Ct.,
Sept. 20, 1989), appeal pending, (Conn. App. Ct. filed Sept. 29, 1989), appeal taken
by Conn. Sup. Ct., No. 13796.
234. Id. at 79. Judge Pressler's leap of faith has precedent, although not an undisputed one. In one of the earliest "right to shelter" cases, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals expanded the reach of the state's adult protective services statute to
guarantee destitute, homeless persons shelter as "incapacitated adults" - over a
vigorous dissent. Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245, 250 (W.Va. 1983).
235. For a description of the procedural history of McCain v. Koch, see supra, note
131.
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posed a duty upon New York City to provide shelter.23 e Further, it found
unpersuasive the city's claim that Quern v. Mandley allowed it to offer something less than what was mandated in the state's AFDC plan.2 3 7 In addition,
the court suggested that AFDC's "equal treatment" regulation required that
access to that benefit be open to all eligible families.2 3 8 In reinstating the first
preliminary injunction to issue in the case, the Court of Appeals held that a
court may indeed promulgate substantive standards, in this case, for quality
of life in a shelter, in the absence of any administrative guidance.2 3 9
Several themes unite these examples. In the New York and New Jersey
cases, instances in which the content of EANFC plans was at issue, there was
no dispute over the applicability of the substantive and structural principles of
AFDC to the programs. New Jersey's strong expressions of legislative intent
to prevent homelessness, 2 40 and New York's constitutional and legislative
provisions for the care of indigent people, 241 enabled the courts to ignore the
Quern rule that states enjoy unlimited discretion to administer their emergency assistance programs. These factors seemed to prove equally compelling in the state courts' willingness, up to a point, to give real, not token,
scrutiny to how well emergency assistance regulations effectuated the purposes of the AFDC plans- ultimately, particularly in the Franklin case, a
highly empirically based, common sense determination. What cannot be discounted, of course, are the facts bespeaking brutal need: evidence replete in
the records of these cases, and amply narrated in the decisions. Clearly, it is
the combination of strongly articulated state welfare policy and wrenching
portraits of deprivation that freed these courts to examine usually sacrosanct
administrative directives.
Advocates for homeless families in New Jersey faced comparatively benign legal conditions in which to litigate the borders of the emergency shelter
assistance program: favorable statements of legislative purpose, public commitments of support from the governor and commissioner of human services,
and some level of appropriations. Where more basic issues are at stakethe actual provision of the shelter itself, of any kind, for any period of timeplaintiffs have upon occasion sought mandates from federal court for en-

236. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 728 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
237. Id. at 729.
238. Id. at 728.
239. McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919
(1987). At this stage, and, indeed, when the New York Supreme Court issued its
preliminary injunction, New York's Commissioner of Social Services had issued regulations containing more comprehensive living standards for shelters. Id at 920.
240. See e.g., the summary of legislation and judicial opinions concerning the
state's obligation to provide housing and shelter to different constituencies, Maticka v.
City of Atlantic City, 216 N.J.Super. 434, 448-450 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1987).
241. See discussion in McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 728730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).

90

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

[VOL.

1:27

forcement of the emergency assistance program as an entitlement under the
Social Security Act. It can be argued that the very indeterminacy of case law
interpreting the place of emergency assistance within the welfare program
has made this necessary. Where states such as New Jersey legislatively articulate strong housing policies, advocates can feel confident of some success in litigating expansive emergency assistance rights in state courts.
Where such policies do not exist, then advocates may have nothing to point
to in order to hedge the discretion of legislatures or social services agencies
in designing emergency assistance programs.
In several federal cases in New York, filed before and during the litigation of the McCain case, litigants sought to establish similar entitlements to
shelter under the emergency assistance state plan. Predicated primarily on
using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to assert claims directly under the Social Security
Act, these suits ended in settlement or dismissal, the latter for abstention due
to the pendency of McCain.2 4 2 The history of two similar federal district court
cases filed on behalf of indigent homeless families in the District of Columbia
suggests that, in addition to the desire to emphasize federal principles of administrative accountability, one motivation to bring "entitlement to shelter"
cases in federal district court is to call federal defendants to account. Simple
access to cash and in-kind forms of emergency assistance, already conceded as available under the District's emergency assistance plan, was the
issue in Feeling v. Barry. The Feeling case remained in litigation due to the
24 3
District's repeated failures to comply, some two years after the settlement.
In Russell v. Barry, where the problem was repeated processless denial of
emergency shelter to homeless families, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the
Feeling decree, the AFDC and EANFC statutes, and the District's own Right to
242. In Koster v. Webb, 598 F.Supp. 1134, (E.D.N.Y. 1983), motion for class cert.
granted sub nom Koster v. Perales, 108 F.R.D. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), stipulation of settlement entered 82 Civ. 2892 (E.D.N.Y. April, 1987), the court ruled that the plaintiffs
had stated a survivable claim that the defendants had violated the federal emergency
assistance regulations and the Social Security Act by failing to provide plaintiffs with
emergency shelter services as designated in the state plan. Koster v. Webb, 598
F.Supp. 1134, 1137. The final settlement set out detailed standards for how families
would gain initial access to emergency housing, for standards of housing, and for
monitoring. Koster, supra, Stipulation of Settlement at 2-5. Plaintiff's case in Canaday
v. Koch, 608 F.Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub nom Cannady (sic) v. Valentin,
768 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985) was dismissed on the grounds of abstention, since McCain v. Koch, reviewing similar issues, was pending. One commentator has noted
how prone litigation concerning homelessness would be to dismissal for reasons of
abstention; that the components of emergency assistance programs are highly discretionary and state law-based would presage this result. Spector, Finding a Federal
Forum: Using the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act to Circumvent Federal Abstention Doctrines, 6 L. & INEQUALITY 273 (1988).
243. See supra note 182, for the procedural history of Feeling v. Barry.

1990]

HEARTBREAK

HOTEL

Overnight Shelter Act. 2 4 4 But plaintiffs also sued the Department of Health
and Human Services under the Administrative Procedure Act. They claimed
that the federal defendants failed in their responsibility, dictated in their regulations, to correct these abuses because they failed to properly monitor the
District's EANFC program.2 4 5
The Russell case also settled, with a detailed set of standards for the
processing of emergency shelter applications and with the District defendants' agreement to promulgate regulations to implement the Overnight Shelter Act. One should note that nearly two years passed between the filing of
the settlement and the publication of the notice of final rulemaking.2 4 6
Enforcing these agreements is a dispiriting process, undertaken painfully
in the face of local government's apparent recalcitrance or inability to comply
either with the federal welfare law or with its own substantive shelter law. In
the Feeling case, resort to federal court made sense to enforce systemic relief under federal law, particularly in the absence of substantive local law conferring a right to shelter.24 7 In Russell, that local cause of action had been
established. Yet the District's consistent failures to implement responsible
welfare programs made the call to a higher enforcement authority attractive.
The necessary trade-off in the Russell 6ettlement was the uncertainty of
whether the court would rule the federal government accountable, against the
seeming certainty of the substantive relief gained.
The disposition of Russell by settlement meant that the federal court
never ruled on the issue of the federal defendants' monitoring responsibilities. Prior to Russell, in Coker v. Bowen, 2 48 advocates had relied on this
strategy as their major cause of action. Coker implicated a national strategy:
to use geographically diverse examples to show that administrative discretion
in running emergency shelter assistance programs had resulted in administrative inequities; and that the responsibility to enforce equitable administration lay not in the local administrators of state plans, but in the federal officials
who control the funding.
In Coker, individual plaintiffs, indigent families in Baltimore and Chicago,
were denied emergency shelter and other emergency services despite their

244. Russell v. Barry, Complaint at 20-21, Civil Action No. 87-2072 (D.D.C., complaint filed July, 1987).
245. Id. at 22.
246. Russell v. Barry, Order, Civil Action No. 87-2072, (D.D.C. December 21,
1987); District of Columbia, Department of Human Services, Notice of Final Rulemaking, Feb. 3, 1989.
247. When Feeling was filed, the District was contesting the validity of Initiative 17,
the D.C. Overnight Right to Shelter Act, subsequently codified at D.C. CODE § 3-601 et
seq. See District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics v. District of Columbia, 520
A.2d 671 (D.C.App. 1986).
248. Coker v. Bowen, 715 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C.1989), appeal pending sub nom.
Coker v. Sullivan, No. 89-5155 (D.C. Cir., filed, 1989).
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eligibility under the states' emergency assistance plans. 2 4 9 Two national organizational plaintiffs also brought the action, and the complaint also details
other states' denials of service to eligible clients. 250 The complaint emphasizes the Secretary's abdication of his monitoring responsibilities for the
AFDC program, as extended to the EANFC program as a part of AFDC.
These responsibilities include the duties to review case files and administrative records for substantive compliance with the emergency assistance plan;
to examine quality control systems to guarantee correction of both erroneous
awards and denials of assistance; to audit finances; to discuss instances of
non-compliance with state officials; and to enforce compliance, impliedly by
the witholding of funds.2 5 1 The plaintiffs concluded that lapses in pursuing
these oversight and enforcement obligations led to inequities in the administration of the state plans. One example given was Illinois' failure to assist
needy non-AFDC families, although its plan did not differentiate between poor
families on the basis of their status as welfare recipients- a clear violation of
the "equal treatment" regulation at 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a). 2 5 2 The conceptual
basis of the entire argument was that the emergency assistance program is
part of the structure of the Social Security Act, and, as such, requires national, uniform enforcement regardless of state-to-state variations in state
plans.
This position was not without some ancillary conceptual support in case
law. The Appellate Division in McCain v. Koch had noted that the "Social
Security Act required mandatory enforcement of the State Plan" as applied to
emergency assistance.2 5 3 What differed here was the identity of the enforcement source. By relying on the Administrative Procedure Act, and not asserting rights of action under the Social Security Act, advocates in Coker
emphasized the centrality of federal government responsibility in the administration of welfare programs, even where the sovereignty of state governments
to control the content of those programs remains, up to the limit of broadly
articulated federal purpose, indisputable.
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' case in Coker, on the basis of that
part of standing doctrine which requires a nexus between the plaintiff's harm
and the defendant's conduct. The court did not disclaim all enforcement duty
on the part of federal officials. But it said that only required aspects of state
plans were subject to such enforcement, because states could drop "optional" elements of their plans at will without fear of federal censure.
Although the court's differentiation between what is a required and what is an
249. Coker v. Bowen, Complaint at 16-19, Civil Action No.86-2448, (D.D.C., complaint filed September 2, 1986).
250. Id. at 4-5.
251. Id. at 9-15. The regulatory duties at issue are set forth at 45 C.F.R. § 201.10(a-

c); 45 C.F.R. § 201.13(b); and 45 C.F.R. § 213.1(b).
252. Id. at 17.
253. McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 728 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
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optional component of a state plan is unclear, it stated that emergency shelter
was an optional component which could be withdrawn, and that a state could
withdraw from the entire emergency assistance program altogether.2 5 4 The
rationale seemed to be that, if the state could escape action to enforce a
service simply by eliminating the service, and do that with impunity, then federal monitoring is an empty threat, and cannot possibly alleviate the harm
done to plaintiffs. Conversely, a failure of federal monitoring could not possibly have caused directly the plaintiffs' injury.
The reasoning may be legally intricate, but it is factually fallacious. Illinois' action in the Quern litigation- to withdraw completely from the emergency assistance program rather than comply with federal strictures- offers
slight historical precedent for the notion that states treat discretionary federal
programs light1y. 2 55 The firestorm that followed HHS' threatened withdrawal
of EANFC funds for hotel housing strongly suggests that no jurisdiction faced
with hundreds of unhoused families will cavalierly drop that desperatelyneeded source. The legal premise is also in doubt. AFDC is also a voluntary
program. But there is no question of the federal government's capability to
dictate the structural, and, where applicable, the substantive features of state
welfare legislation under AFDC, and, if necessary, to enforce that control
through withdrawal of funds. 2 56 The court's implication- that the governing
structures of AFDC apart from the substantive aspects of the program do not
apply to emergency assistance- only make sense if one accepts that Quem
v. Mandley separates the emergency assistance program completely from its
parent program. If that reading is correct- and readings of Blum v. Bacon
suggest that it is not- then it is difficult to see where homeless families can
go for relief, if they are unfortunate enough to live in states that inadequately
police their own emergency assistance programs.
The cases in which plaintiffs tried to enforce uniform distribution of
EANFC benefits, and cases in which plaintiffs sought to change the level of
the "routine" monthly benefit, attack different parts of the same assumptions
that dictate the structure of the AFDC program. As we have seen, plaintiffs
filed the EANFC cases as enforcement actions, with the goal of restricting the
discretion usually accorded to the givers of emergency assistance, and to
make them as accountable to clearly defined programmatic standards as
they had become in the "regular" welfare program. The challenge posed by
the "standard of need" cases is more obvious: to question not only the substantive economic givens underlying each state's payment standards, but the
254. Coker v. Bowen, 715 F. Supp. 383, 390 (D.D.C. 1989).
255. For a description of the facts in that litigation, see supra notes 163-164 and
accompanying text.
256. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968): "There is of course
no question that the Federal Government, unless barred by some controlling constitutional prohibition, may impose the terms and conditions upon which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed, and that any state law or regulation
inconsistent with such federal terms and conitions is to that extent invalid."
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procedural assumptions about the complete discretion state legislatures assume in setting the standards.
For me to write about the standard of need cases in this article is superfluous and presumptuous. No one is better qualified to write about this area
than Steve Banks, the architect of the litigation culminating in one of several
standard of need" decisions. 2 57 Others, also involved in the same and
similar litigation, have described the tribulations involved in this strategy. 2 58
In the context of the emergency assistance programs, a serious question remains of whether this strategy, or the one that attempts to regularize the ad-

257. Two of the lawsuits - Massachusetts Coalition for the Homeless v. Dukakis,
400 Mass. 806, 511 N.E.2d 603, and Jiggetts v. Grinker, 139 Misc.2d 476, 528
N.Y.S.2d 462 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1987), 148 A.2d 1, 543 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989), rev'd No. 46 (N.Y. April 3, 1990), challenged the shelter components of the
states' consolidated AFDC grants. In Massachusetts Coalition, the procedural history
of which was extremely complex, the trial court agreed with plaintiffs' original assertion that the assessment of both components of a welfare payment - the official standard of need and the actual payment - was under state law the responsibility of the
Department of Public Welfare, which had violated its duty under state law to maintain
payments at a level sufficient to support a child in her own home. Massachusetts
Coalition, No. 80109, Slip. Op. at 14-15, (Mass. Super.Ct., June 26, 1986). Subsequently, the trial court ruled that the DPW's placement of families in transitory shelter
was an illegal substitute for the provision of sufficient income to enable children to live
in actual homes. Massachusetts Coalition, No. 80109, Slip Op. at 12-13 (Mass.
Super. Ct., January 5, 1987). The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that it was the duty of
the legislature, not of the agency, to set standards of need, but the obligation of the
agency to provide enough assistance to enable a child to live at home, not in a shelter.
Massachusetts Coalition, 511 N.E.2d 603, at 609, 611 (1987). In Jiggetts, in overruling the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals held that § 350(1)(a) of the New York
Social Services Law required the state welfare agency to get shelter allowances commensurate with actual housing costs. Jiggetts v. Grinker, No. 46 Slip Op. (N.Y., April
3, 1990).
Petitioners in the consolidated petitions ruled on in In the Matter of Petitions for
Rulemaking, 223 N.J.Super.453, 538 A.2d 1302 (N.J. Super.Ct. App.Div.1988), cert.
granted 111 N.J. 638, 546 A.2d 550 (1988), aff'd 117 N.J. 311, 566 A.2d 1154
(1989), were recipients of AFDC and of the state's program of general assistance. The
court in this litigation also found that the state's public welfare agency was statutorily
obligated to adjust the standard of need. 223 N.J.Super. at 460, 538 A.2d at 1306.
Similarly, in Boehm v. Superior Court of Merced County, 178 Cal.App.3d 494, 223
Cal. Rptr. 716 (1986), a challenge to the county's decrease in the level of state-funded
general assistance, the court held that the state Welfare and Institutions Code compelled counties to determine their assistance grants according to the results of studies
in the cost of necessities. Boehm at 501,223 Cal.Reptr. at 720.
258. For other descriptions and analyses of the strategy of relying on state welfare
statutes and state constitutions to attack the sufficiency of the shelter components of
state standards of need, see Sard, The Role of the Courts in Welfare Reform, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 367, 381-8 (1988), and Morawetz, Welfare Litigation to Prevent
Homelessness, 16 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 565, 572-581 (1987-88).
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ministration of EANFC as a welfare program is likely to be more beneficial as
a means to force the provision of shelter or longer term housing.
As originally pleaded, both Russell v. Barry, and Coker v. Bowen were
premised on the theory that EANFC is an AFDC program: that its structure,
like AFDC, marries federal and state interests; that its administration, like
AFDC, is ultimately conformable to federal standards and enforceable by the
witholding of federal dollars. Given the gravity of the federal benefit now at
stake under the emergency program- the provision of shelter- these conclusions seem desirable. Shelter is too important to be subject to a multitude
of different standards of urgency, or eligibility. "Emergency assistance" as a
one-time, transitory expedient creates no expectation of continued aid, and
thus no entitlement; "emergency shelter," as it continues for weeks and
months, in the absence of no better governmental solution for the housing of
poor people, simultaneously creates an expectation and cripples the ability of
the shelter resident to seek anything better. As such, emergency shelter
should also be protected as an entitlement, meaning that it should be subject
to the same due process protections statutorily guaranteed in the SSA.2 5 9
For purposes of standardization and predictability, it makes good litigative
sense to argue that EANFC should be run according to the principles of
AFDC: equal treatment of all recipients, and due process protections to all.
However, the disadvantages of arguing that EANFC is an appendage of the
AFDC program are visible from the possibilities raised in French v. Mansour:
many aspects of the AFDC program bear as little relation to the realities of
economic need as do the value-laden eligibility criteria of some state EANFC
programs.
IX.

CONCLUSIONIF NOT THE RIGHT TO SHELTER, PERHAPS THE
RIGHT TO STABILITY?

In discussing concepts of communal participation, Robert Fullinwinder
has described Benjamin Constant's use of a highway as metaphor for the
liberal view: individuals journeying individually, along a common road.2 6 °
The road metaphor applies cruelly and accurately to homeless people. The
very statutes and judicial interpretations which offer any support to indigent
families do so with the purpose not of providing permanency of place, but of
providing aid for the journey. The genesis of federal emergency assistance
to families, as I described earlier, lay in plans to aid migrant workers, whose
poverty and presence could be counted on to be transitory, with the assistance crafted to keep it that way. Shapiro v. Thompson, the Supreme Court
case that comes the closest to validating a jurisprudence of need, actually
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1985), which requires the state to contain in its
plan provisions for fair hearings for applicants for AFDC in the event of denial or termination of benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) is silent on appeals procedures.
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safeguards not the right to subsistence, but the right to travel in order to secure it. 2 6 1 Given the relatively secure status of AFDC as an entitlement, as
compared to housing, it has made sense to look to the rules of that program
as a way of obtaining shelter. But, as we have seen, to try to coax housing
out of a system so conceptually ground in mobility, transiency, and rootlessness begs failure.
One vaunted goal in providing public assistance of any type is to decrease dependency by limiting the assistance. By providing stable housing,
or incomes adequate to retain it, we might appear to be encouraging dependency. But in fact, by stabilizing the environment within which families can be
educated and trained for self-sufficiency, government would in that way be
more likely to produce families capable of subsisting without the government's assistance. Michael Walzer has noted the partial "decommodification" of some services, such as medical care, because the providers of these
services are specialized and privileged, and because receipt of the service is
essential to membership in the community. 26 2 Critics who espouse the
"decommodification" of housing, the insulation of housing from market
forces, do so for similar reasons.2 6 3 Provision of housing is expensive, and
accessible without assistance to only a few; without the base of physical stability that housing gives, no one can exercise the liberal democratic prerogatives of membership- mobility and choice. In a sense, what one can
advocate for is not, given our jurisprudence, a right to subsistence, or a right
to shelter, but a right to stability- the means of acquiring what we persist in
seeing as economic goods. Without that adjunct right, one can indeed check
out, but one can never leave.
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